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KENNETH BURKE

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KENN

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Berkeley

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I regret that I did not have an opportunity to incorporate additions suggested by a six-month sojourn at the University of Chicago where, under the auspices of the College, I presented some of this material.

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K. B.

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1. HENRY JAMES ON
2. "SOCIAL RATING" C
3. RHETORICAL NAME
4. THE "DANGER OF M
5. ELATION AND ACC
6. YEARS: "BYZANTU
7. ELIOT: EARLY POR
8. PRINCIPLE OF THE
9. ULTIMATE IDENTI

THE ONLY difficult portion at the start. There, selected poetry, we try to show are also called for. Since a typical text for today is quite different realm than the imagery of killing is but one represent the process of implications of a preference state that the principles of which they stand for are

We emerge from the Hence, readers who would a text until it is gradually opening pages, with the they come to the general

Thereafter, with this areas of rhetoric, by showing where it is not usually re would but rediscover when rhetoric as a terminology such as esthetics, came to the fore (so that other sciences we have the rich rhetorical elements

But besides this job of text beyond the traditional area of expression the unconscious. It lies directly purposive. For intentions with the good of unjustified. He may be advantage at the public ex

may willingly make sacrifices in behalf of such identification. Here is a rhetorical area not analyzable either as sheer design or as sheer simplicity. And we would treat of it here.

Traditionally, the key term for rhetoric is not "identification," but "persuasion." Hence, to make sure that we do not maneuver ourselves unnecessarily into a weak position, we review several classic texts which track down all the major implications of that term. Our treatment, in terms of identification, is decidedly not meant as a substitute for the sound traditional approach. Rather, as we try to show, it is but an accessory to the standard lore. And our book aims to make itself at home in both emphases.

Particularly when we come upon such aspects of persuasion as are found in "mystification," courtship, and the "magic" of class relationships, the reader will see why the classical notion of clear persuasive intent is not an accurate fit, for describing the ways in which the members of a group promote social cohesion by acting rhetorically upon themselves and one another. As W. C. Blum has stated the case deftly, "In identification lies the source of dedications and enslavements, in fact of cooperation."

All told, persuasion ranges from the bluntest quest of advantage, as in sales promotion or propaganda, through courtship, social etiquette, education, and the sermon, to a "pure" form that delights in the process of appeal for itself alone, without ulterior purpose. And identification ranges from the politician who, addressing an audience of farmers, says, "I was a farm boy myself," through the mysteries of social status, to the mystic's devout identification with the source of all being.

That the reader might find it gratifying to observe the many variations on our two interrelated themes, at every step we have sought to proceed by examples. Since we did not aim to write a compendium, we have not tried to cover the field in the way that a comprehensive historical survey might do— and another volume will be needed to deal adequately with the polemic kinds of rhetoric (such as the verbal tactics now called "cold war").

But we have tried to show what portions of other works should be selected as parts of a "course in rhetoric," and how they should be considered for our particular purposes. We have tried to show how rhetorical analysis throws light on literary texts and human relations gen-

erally. And while intent sought above all else to

We do not flatter ourselves to counteract the torrent of temporaries have so avowed more strident our journal churchmen become, the

written for tolerance and

THE RAN

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AN OLD POET, libe
in sullen warlike verse o
Samson among the Phi
... blind among enem
his strength" ... himself
... his sightlessness in
with himself for having

The s
Wom

for having given up his
his "corporal servitude.
of revenge in the name
pagan temple, standing
arched roof gave main
("O lastly over-strung
killed . . ."), he sufferin

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Upon the bea
Lords, ladies,
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Of this, but ex
Met from all p
Samson, with
Pulled down t
The vulgar on

And at this act, or s

place. We learn that the enemy, "drunk with adoltery, drunk with wine," had been led by the wrath of Samson's God to bring on "their own destruction." For they were "with blindness internal struck." But Samson had been "with inward eyes illuminated." They are the sightless, he is the seer, and

... as an eagle

His cloudless thunder bruid on their heads.

The vanquished enemy, by comparison, were but "tame villatic fowl."

More than twenty years before, in the *Arcopagitica* ("A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, to the parliament of England"), his great verbal monument that gives dignity, resonance, and ultimate grounding to the doctrine of the free press, a related reference to the eagle appeared:

Metinks I see in my mind's eye a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks. Metinks I see her as an eagle mewing her mighty youth, and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full midday beam; purging and unscaling her long-abused sight at the fountain itself of heavenly radance; while the whole noise of timorous and flocking birds, with those also that love the twilight, flutter about, amazed at what she means, and in their envious gabble would prognosticate a year of sews and schisms.

The prose reference is clearly rhetorical. It occurs in a work written with a definite audience in mind, and for a definite purpose. It was literature for use. Today, it would be called "propaganda."

But what of the poem? One can read it simply *in itself*, without even considering the fact that it was written by Milton. It can be studied and appreciated as a structure of internally related parts, without concern for the correspondence that almost inevitably suggests itself: the correspondence between Milton's blindness and Samson's, or between the poet's difficulties with his first wife and Delilah's betrayal of a divine "secret."

Besides this individual identification of the author with an aggressive, self-destructive hero who was in turn identified with God, there is also factional identification. Samson has said:

All the contest is now
Twixt Gull and Dagon. Dagon hath presumed,
Me overthrow'n, to enter lists with Gull,
His deity comparing and preferring
Before the God of Abraham.

And this exalting of the hero is allusive: the Philistines are "drunk with wine," while the Israelites stand for the Pious ferocity is no mere sheer poetic exercise, and whatever kind of role it

Rather, it is almost a cantankerous old fight and whose very translation terms helps, by such necessity of his resistance here *did* conquer, the blindness *will* conquer. a kind of "literature for use" that the technologically use, since it is wholly in

Quali

Note another result of the nature of Samson's act (slaying the enemy) can be a side; yet Milton's religious his misfortunes to live could no longer release son a figure ambivalent ing trends. Here too, the "for use": the poetic ree for admitting a motive fronted in its simplicity subterfuge Milton could if reduced to a concept

The dramatic terms whatever modicum of a mula as a whole. But tions, are dropped whi strand, slant, or "gist," plicity dominant motive

these qualifications which the reduction would omit are strategic enough to make the motivations quite different from an out-and-out featuring of suicide as cause, in a poem stressing the theme directly, efficiently, without the modifiers of Milton's context. By comparison with such a poem, Milton's meaning would not be a recipe for suicide at all, having but a mere dash, or soupçon, of such an ingredient.

We do not mean to suggest that the figure of Samson in Milton's poem is to be interpreted purely as a "rationalization," in the psycho-analytic sense. We are taking the poem at its face value. If two statements, for instance, one humorous and the other humorless, are found to contain the same animus against someone, we are not thereby justified in treating them as the same in their motivational core. For the humorless statement may *foretell* homicide, and the humorous one may be the very thing that *forestalls* homicide. Thus *surrounded*, or modified by the total motivational context, the animus in one case may be as different from the other as yes from no. Indeed, the humorous motivation could lead to intentional homicide only insofar as it were reduced, with the qualifications of humor dropped from it. It could not, as *humor*, lead to this result, however "homicidal" might be the imagery in which it was expressed. For this imagery, *so long as it was humorous*, would contain a dimension which essentially qualified the animus. The imagery could "foretell" homicide only in the sense that it contained an ingredient which, if efficiently abstracted from its humorous modifiers, would in its new purity be homicidal. And such abstracting can take place, of course, whenever conditions place too much of a strain upon the capacity for humor.

Similarly, a motive introduced in one work, where the context greatly modifies it and keeps it from being drastically itself, may lack such important modifications in the context of another work. The *proportions* of these modifications themselves are essential in defining the total motivation, which cannot, without misinterpretation, be reduced merely to the one "gist," with all the rest viewed as mere concealment or "rationalization" of it. And in this sense, we would take the motivation of Milton's poem at face value, considering the aggressive and theocratic terms just as significant in the total recipe as the reflexive terms are. Whether there are gods or not, there is an *objective* difference in motivation between an act conceived in the name of God and an act conceived in the name of godless Nature.

Contrast the imagery of Empedocles on Etna," for i among prosperous boys? The burden of ourselves ing ("thou hast no right repose"); nonaggressive take me home!"; weary him from the multitude yearning to descend "D . . ." Empedocles sees center," a self-immolation sea, stars, and air, while is also by legend the pe earth" who had been "o

When matched with s out a good case for deny slain" Samson has any in look if we insert another his poem of Empedocles, same motives are discern where the two warriors they are father and son paralyzed at the sound o

When Rustum
Glor'd, and h
And shout'd:
And shrank a
And scant'd
And then he
His covering
He reel'd, and
And then the
And the brig
The cloud; a
Saw Rustum
And Subrah,

Following the recognition, and the son's death, there is even the same cosmically unifying end as with Empedocles' self-immolating plunge into the crater. But here the action is transferred from the personae to sympathetic nature (from agents to similarly motivated scene, itself a new and transcendent order of action). As "Rustum and his son were left alone" by the river marge, "the majestic river floated on," a solemn course, charted by the poem through many lines,

till at last
The long'd-for dash of waves is heard, and wide
His luminous home of waters opens, bright
And tranquil, from whose floor the new-bathed stars
Emerge, and shine upon the Aral Sea.

Here, the son having been killed by the father, through the progress of the river to the sea he plunges by proxy into the universal home. And graced by the son's sacrifice, the armies are at peace.

Our knowledge of Matthew Arnold's relation to his father suggests an extra-literary "use" for the imagery of self-effacement in both these poems. Despite their many differences, both are acts of the same poetic agent, sharing the common substance of the one authorship. And both can be seen as aspects of the same attitude towards life. Indeed, when we put them together, we note this possibility: that Arnold could poetically identify himself with the figure of Empedocles because his pious deference to the authority of his father could be aptly expressed in such imagery of self-effacement as goes with Empedocles' cosmically motivated despair. And this self-abnegatory attitude, being in the same motivational cluster with his attitude towards his father, could find still more accurate expression in the imagery of a son "unconsciously" killed by his father, and *in the name of his father*.

Seen from this point of view, the "gist" of "Sohrab and Rustum" would be as "suicidal" as "Empedocles on Etna," where this theme is *explicitly* there. It would be "implicit" in "Sohrab and Rustum" because, for all the imagery of war surrounding the combat between father and son, it all "adds up" or "boils down" to a son's fatal admiration for his father. The poet, in both cases, imagines that the figure with whom he identifies himself is *being killed*; and in both cases the destruction terminates in imagery of a homecoming, a return to sources probably maternal.

Just what are we getting
look if we put a transition
Samson Agonistes. Sin
kills the enemy, we tried
poet in the same "curve"
killed by suicide; the sec
Empedocles and Sohrab
poetic agent who had id
establish the common cl
Then, looking back at th
poem, what Arnold has
the warlike death are un

See what our problem
In some respects, we are
stances of the *same* mot
that the unique context
makes the motive itself a
line of thinking clear he
for instance, is "warlike"
"Sohrab and Rustum."
caused by the sound of f
unwarlike images. Thu
wounded Sohrab,

Of age and
Pitrous and
Like some
Of an unsk
Mowing th
And lies, a
On the mo
Lovely in d

And when Sohrab finally
perious anguish,"

The crimson
Like the so

Left, lushly gather'd, on the native bank,
By children when their nurses call with base
Indoors from the sun's eye . . .

Such unwarlike modifiers radically modify the motive of war here, quite as the motive of self-destruction which we saw clearly stated in "Empedocles on Etna" is modified by the dramatic irony whereby the son is sacrificed in the name of the father. And as contrasted with the righteous fury of Milton, we see how Arnold's attitudes were more closely akin, rather, to the next step in the curve of literary history; we see how they led into the catheticism of Pater, and thence to father-problems as transformed perversely in the estheticism of Oscar Wilde.

The Imaging of Transformation

By adding one more confusion, we may add the element that can bring clarity. This time, from the same "curve of history," from Coleridge's "Religious Musings":

. . . in His vast family no Cain
Injures uninjured (in her best-aimed blow
Victorious Murder a blind Suicide).

This statement suggests a point at which murder and suicide can become convertible, each in its way an image for the same motive. The quotation is not quite analogous to the three other poems, since it is from a *doctrinal* poem (one of what Coleridge called his Conversation Pieces, "*sermons propriated*"). But although it lacks the dramatic modifiers that complicate the motivation in the other poems, it avoids overefficient reduction to "gist," at least in the sense that it is dialectical, ironically making motives interchangeable which might usually be considered mutually exclusive. Indeed, the terms being equivalent, we might just as well read them backwards: "blind Suicide a Victorious Murder." Then we might think either of a poem which symbolized suicide by imagery of murder, or one which symbolized murder by imagery of suicide. And when you get to that point, you need one more step to complete your thinking: You need to look for a *motive that can serve as ground for both these choices*, a motive that, while not being exactly either one or the other, can ambiguously contain them both.

A term serving as ground for both these terms would, by the same

token, "transcend" them; it admits rival contestants to tensionalism, being "superior" to the conditions of the terms. The *principles of war* are ineluctable to universal principles; the poet's identification with the other, is, from the "terms for transformation."

When we consider this, we necessarily disregard the would-be a very wrong formation is to be analyzed in general, we may stress that an image can perform the same. Upward Way and Downward Exile and Homecoming, Egressus and Regressus, Outward, or of seasonal Day and Night, Warmth and Cooling, Loosing and Binding, placed statically against each other represent a development in terms, here selected at random, terms of which the poem is localized, or particularized.

The Education of Hamlet transformation by a shift. The student of life "in identification with a new eighteenth-century identity adapt himself to the conditions of them. Thus the ritual of immolation. But instead into the volcano as man the sweep of history, which (his transformation by personalization). That

considered from the symbolic point of view, is nothing other than the *imaging of a fall*, expressed roundabout in doctrinal or "educational" terms. Within the limitations imposed by the nature of the book, the final proclaiming of this "law," in strict analogy with the accelerated motion of falling bodies, in its way expresses but the same leap into the cosmic abyss that Matthew Arnold expresses through the suicide of Eteocles.

The range of images that can be used for concretizing the process of transformation is limited only by the imagination and ingenuity of poets. But the selective nature of existence favors some images above others—and high among them, naturally, is the imagery of Life and Death, with its variants of being born, being reborn, dying, killing, and being killed. Consider, now, the hypothetical case of a poet who would identify himself with some particular imagery of transformation selected from this order of terms, terms using the imagery of Life and Death. We can easily conceive of a poet who, wanting to symbolize the transformation of some evil trait within himself, writes a poem accordingly; and in this poem he might identify himself with a figure who, marked by this trait, takes his own life, thereby ritualistically transforming the trait. (That is, if the figure in the fiction possessed some outstanding vice, and slew himself as an act of judgment against this vice, such imagery of suicide could be a ritualistic means whereby the poet sought to purge his own self of this vice, or purified the vice by identifying it with the dignity of death.) Or another might symbolize this same transformation by imaginatively endowing some "outward enemy" with the trait, and then imaginatively slaying that enemy. Or a third poet might identify himself with a figure who possessed that trait, and then might imagine an enemy who slew his poetic counterpart. The trait, whatever its stylistic transformation (magnification, purification, martyrdom, etc.), may not even be "slain" by an "alien" principle at all, so far as the original poet was concerned; the contest may most likely symbolize the pitting of one motivational principle against another where *both* principles are strongly characteristic of the poet personally. (Think, for instance, of the "murderous" relation between the critical and poetic "selves" of T. S. Eliot, as symbolized in his *Murder in the Cathedral*, and previously discussed in our *Attitudes Toward History*.) Similarly, if a principle were located in the figure of mother, father, child, tyrant, or king, and were ritually

transformed under these y
patricide, infanticide, tyr
the *transformationum* in th
gave us a "scientific" var
analytic search for "uncon
family, either through riv
in reverse, puts the compl
"desire to kill" a certain
a desire to *transform the*

Dramatic and

Since imagery built abo
death (killing, self-killing
to dramatic intensity, and
man motivation, we usual
But there is also an ulim
imagery, since a history
essence or nature, as with
a comedy by the outcome
into "comedy" merely by
act.

Elsewhere (notably on
Motives, New York: Pre
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equivalent by statement i
(as feudal thinking charac
that identified him with hi
nition being perhaps the
man's character). But if
theological or metaphysic
in terms of a divine parent
is also an ultimate of *end*
defined narratively in ter
state a man's timeless esse
him "by nature a criminal

Metaphysically, this form

in the Aristotelian *entelechy*, which classifies a thing by conceiving of its kind according to the perfection (that is, finishedness) of which that kind is capable. Man is a "rational animal," for instance, not in the sense that he is immune to irrational motives, but in the sense that the perfection of humankind is in the order of rationality (an order or finishedness which one would not apply to things incapable of *Logos*, the Word).

Such thinking was probably itself a translation of narrative terms into "timeless" ones (as the Homeric ways of essentializing in terms of act and image eventually became transformed into the high generalizations of philosophy). But once we have a mature set of such abstract fixities (which are "fixities" in the sense that the "laws" or "principles" of motion do not themselves move, if they are stated abstractly enough), we can turn the matter around; and thus, whereas the philosophic expressions were later translations of the earlier narrative ones, we may look upon narrative expressions as translations of philosophic ones. By such heuristic reversal, we note how the imagery of death could be a narrative equivalent of the Aristotelian *entelechy*. For the poet could define the essence of a motive narratively or dramatically (in terms of a *history*) by showing how that motive *ended*: the maturity or fulfillment of a motive, its "perfection" or "finishedness," if translated into the terms of tragic outcome, would entail the identifying of that motive with a narrative figure whose acts led to some fitting form of *death*. By its fruition, we should judge it. In this respect, the Christian injunction to lead the "dying life" is itself a formula that translates the Aristotelian *entelechy* into its tragic equivalent; for in both the speculative and the tragic expressions, there is the same underlying Grammatical principle, the defining of an essence in terms of the *end* (the *perfection* being by the same token *death*, quite as the attaining of a given end marks the death of such efforts as went with the attaining of that end). The relations among our words "define," "determine," "termination," suggest the same ambiguities and possibilities of conversion. Taking a hint from the English translation of Richard Strauss's tone poem, *Death and Transfiguration*, we might say that the tragic dignifying of a motive is got by identifying it with death as transfiguration.

In sum: When considering "the temporizing of essence" in the *Grammar*, we were both put on the trail and misled somewhat by the

suggestions in the word the search for "logical" p narrative terms, be expre hood," or in other imager the statement of essence overlook the exactly opp terms of *culmination* ("w up" does serve for the lo down to"). In either che terminology provides for lines we may note that th the tuberculosis sanitarium serve particularly well as combines both "regressive tion. For the adult patient are in a condition that has the same time they are to

"Tragic" T

So universally felt is the of essence in terms of dea days, when the cult of q unction, perhaps one mig "personality types" if he Surely, for instance, the p thereby distinguishes him cutting their veins and b end of Milton's Samson d quite as Milton differs fr

But perhaps to get the tion, while still keeping t our hypothetical nontragic tion of human endings. I of putting them to work, a ing of reasons why our c of manufactured and "pro cession of ends) he shoul

average middle-class audience, all the different ways in which, it is thought, the world itself might end. Surely, it would not take much to distinguish between the character of a person who foresaw a world ending "not with a bang but a whimper," and one who feared some mighty holocaust, as were the planets ripped into smithereens by explosions from within. Or contrast the medieval imagery of the mighty burning with many modern scientists' pale preference for the "heat death," according to the principle of inturning, or entropy, whereby the earlier potency of matter must finally dwindle into a universal, uniform impotence. Those who thought of a lethal gas that, wandering through space, stealthily enveloped the earth would be quite different from those obsessed by thoughts of huge astral collisions, or from those who worried lest our sun suddenly burst forth as a Nova, so intense in its new activity that even Neptune and Pluto would be scorched. People would here spontaneously classify themselves; for by reason of the "scene-agent ratio"¹ the individual can identify himself with the character of a surrounding situation, translating one into terms of the other; hence a shift to a grander order, the shift from thoughts of one's own individual end to thoughts of a universal end, would still contrive to portray the character of the individual, even while acquiring greater resonance and scope and enabling men to transcend too local a view of themselves.

Perhaps our plans here are too ambitious. We can at least claim, as remote members of our "neotragic" school of ethnic classification, certain modern biologists who propose to classify plant species according to differences in response to various kinds of mutilation (though such science perhaps has a trace of that purely *subtistic* motive which usually obscures our understanding of tragedy itself today).

Recapitulation

First, we noted Milton's identification with Samson, who was identified with God. Then we noted the identification of Royalists with Philistines and Puritans with Israelites. Next we noted the poet's opportunity to conquer ritualistically by writing a poem that used these identifications, whereas actually Milton as citizen was frustrated.

¹ See *A Grammar of Motives* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945), notably pages 7-9.

Next, while recognizing that this amounted to suicide, we saw that this motive contains only the germ to consider the *proportion* which would reduce the totality to the minimum of justice to the motivation. This is done by contrasting *Samson* with the *Samson* in Matthew Arnold's poem, as contrasted with modern life.

Then, by quoting lines which are interchangeable, we saw that transformation in general, which might serve as well as the principle of transformation, is the killing, and the killing of the self, of transformation.

However, there was a shift, which was especially apt here, from the dramatic way of identifying the "topsis" would be a uare of a thing's "finishedness."

Then, in an aside, as we saw, whereby personality type is determined upon the type of given person must read.

All told, we would find ways of translating our opening anecdote, the import of the image, characterizing a given motive, and effect upon an audience.

Taken simply at its face, it is in accordance with its nature, is trained by our motives, brutality and murder, a

ideal or imaginary adult world. By the time he is fifteen, he has "witnessed" more violence than most soldiers or gunmen experience in a lifetime. And he has "participated in" all this imagery, "empathically reenacting" it. Thus initiated, he might well think of "growing up" (that is, of "transformation") in such excessive terms. His awareness of himself as a developing person requires a vocabulary—and the images of brutality and violence provide such a vocabulary, with a simple recipe for the perfecting or empowering of the self by the punishing and slaying of troublesome motives as though they were wholly external. One can surely expect such imagery to have sinister effects, particularly in view of the fact that the excessive *naturalism* of modern photographic art presents the violence, as nearly as possible, without formal devices that bring out the purely *artistic* or *fictive* nature of such art. There is no difference, in photographic style, between the filming of a murder mystery and the filming of a "documentary." Nor should we forget the possible bad effect of the many devices whereby such brutality is made "virtuous," through dramatic pretenses that justify it in terms of retaliation and righteous indignation.

Our objections arise when certain kinds of speculation (often of psychoanalytic cast) unwittingly exemplify these same sinister trends. By itself stressing the primacy of vengeance and slaughter as motives (and looking upon friendly or ethical motives purely as a kind of benign fiction for harnessing these more nearly "essential" impulses), such thought is really more like the *fore-runner* of modern militarism than its *crisis*. And often the analysts will show such zeal, in behalf of "killing" as the essential motive, that they will seek many ingenious ways of showing that a work was motivated by the desire to slay some parental figure who suffered no such fate at all, in the imagery of the plot as interpreted on its face. They apparently assume that to show "unconscious" parricidal implications in a motive is by the same token to establish parricide as *the* motive. Where a play is explicitly about parricide, one might feel some justification in complaining if we would see behind it merely the choice of a parental symbol to represent some motivation not intrinsically parricidal at all, but using parental identifications as "imagined accidents" that personify it. But whatever may be the objections in such cases, they would not apply at all in cases where there is no explicit imagery of parricide, and one must by exegesis hunt out parricide as motive. Why, one may then ask, must

an imagery of parricide designate of the unknown? One may also ask: why must we take it as ultimate, rather than as specifying or localizing imagery, either scenic or personal?

That is, we can recognize, of personal enmity, of logomachy, all of them, as drastically encountering the Scramble, of insult and cloak, of the he, cloaked malice, that the genius of our era can, without forcing, find these; for rhetoric a sacrificial, evangelical law in sexual love, to sheer the area where love "technologized," that of discern the vestiges of the

We considered, among was put, the poet's identity in slaying enemies of the Puritans and Israelites, being for a ritualistic kind by allusion to a Biblical his vanquished faction. kind of identification: his magnified or perfected ascended; the imagery of dramatic equivalent for thing's nature would be ideal fulfillment, proper

As seen from this point of either the self or another

case of identification in general. Or otherwise put: the imagery of slaying is a special case of transformation, and transformation involves the ideas and imagery of *identification*. That is: the *killing* of something is the *changing* of it, and the statement of the thing's nature before and after the change is an *identifying* of it.

Perhaps the quickest way to make clear what we are doing here is to show what difference it makes. Noting that tragic poets identify motives in terms of killing, one might deduce that "they are essentially killers." Or one might deduce that "they are essentially identifiers." Terms for identification in general are wider in scope than terms for killing. We are proposing that our rhetoric be reduced to this term of wider scope, with the term of narrower scope being treated as a species of it. We begin with an anecdote of killing, because invective, eristic, polemic, and logomachy are so pronounced an aspect of rhetoric. But we use a dialectical device (the shift to a higher level of generalization) that enables us to transcend the narrower implications of this imagery, even while keeping them clearly in view. We need never deny the presence of strife, enmity, faction as a characteristic motive of rhetorical expression. We need not close our eyes to their almost tyrannous ubiquity in human relations; we can be on the alert always to see how such temptations to strife are implicit in the institutions that condition human relationships; yet we can at the same time always look beyond this order, to the principle of identification in general, a terministic choice justified by the fact that the identifications in the order of love are also characteristic of rhetorical expression. We may as well be frank about it, since our frankness, if it doesn't convince, will at least serve another important purpose of this work: it will reveal a strategic resource of terminology. Being frank, then: Because of our choice, we can treat "war" as a "*special case of peace*"—not as a primary motive in itself, not as *essentially* real, but purely as a *derivative* condition, a *perversion*.

Identification and "Consubstantiality"

A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is *identified* with B. Or he may *identify himself* with B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so.

Here are ambiguities. He is "substantially one" with B at the same time he remains unjoined with B. He is both joined and separated from B. He is consubstantial with another.

While consubstantial with B, he is derived, the offspring of B. In this sense, there is nothing absolute about him. He is and is not one with B. He is identified in terms of some "substantiality" that does not depend on B.

To identify A with B is to identify A with B in a certain way, since our *Grammar* identifies "substance" as key term, though not in the areas of persuasion. And our third volume, *Identity* as titular or anecdotal, could be reduced and further created, as from a common source, to its uniqueness as an entity having its own particularity.

However, "substance" has a long history of quarantining a function in men's systems to abolish it altogether—without themselves that they realize their motives. They abolished the function, but never abolish the *function* itself. *want* to. A doctrine of *substance* may be necessary to any physics, was an *act*; and acting together, men have attitudes that make them

The *Grammar* dealt with considered resources of thought. The *Symbolic* its own peculiarly constructions" being capable of

consider them primarily in their capacity as singulars, each a separate universe of discourse (though there are also respects in which they are consubstantial with others of their kind, since they can be classed with other unique individuals as joint participants in common principles, possessors of the same or similar properties).

The *Rhetoric* deals with the possibilities of classification in its *partisan* aspects; it considers the ways in which individuals are at odds with one another, or become identified with groups more or less at odds with one another.

Why "at odds," you may ask, when the titular term is "identification"? Because, to begin with "identification" is, by the same token, though roundabout, to confront the implications of *division*. And so, in the end, men are brought to that most tragically ironic of all divisions, or conflicts, wherein millions of cooperative acts go into the preparation for one single destructive act. We refer to that ultimate *disease of cooperation: war*. (You will understand war much better if you think of it, not simply as strife come to a head, but rather as a disease, or perversion of communion. Modern war characteristically requires a myriad of constructive acts for each destructive one; before each culminating blast there must be a vast network of interlocking operations, directed continually.)

Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity. If men were wholly and truly of one substance, absolute communication would be of man's very essence. It would not be an ideal, as it now is, partly embodied in material conditions and partly frustrated by these same conditions; rather, it would be as natural, spontaneous, and total as with those ideal prototypes of communication, the theologian's angels, or "messengers."

The *Grammar* was at peace insofar as it contemplated the paradoxes common to all men, the universal resources of verbal placement. The *Symbolic* should be at peace, in that the individual substances, or entities, or constituted acts are there considered in their uniqueness, hence outside the realm of conflict. For individual universes, as such, do not compete. Each merely *is*, being its own self-sufficient realm of discourse. And the *Symbolic* thus considers each thing as a set of inter-

related terms all conspiring in a common substance compete with other in the individual is treated peculiar nature. It is "a ing one another. For flict with other individuals would fall under the b he victim of a neurotic he is heckled like Hitler constant wrangle in his upon his people a flat che cally, the neurotic's ever diorganized by rival fa considered Symbolically the sense that his identi terms. For even antagon and thrust, can be said form.

The *Rhetoric* must be the Market Place, the the Give and Take, the the Logomachy, the ou It too has its peaceful n add up to the transcend from the factional to the often beset by strife as t material embodiment. into a partisan weapon. "identification" very sha counterpart: division. after the Fall. Its cont often carry us far into t

The Ide

Metaphysically, a thin of Rhetoric, such identi

materialistic sense of the term, economic property, such property as Coleridge, in his "Religious Musings," calls a

two-streaming fount,
Whence Vice and Virtue flow, honey and gall.

And later:

From Avarice thus, from Luxury and War
Sprang heavenly Science; and from Science, Freedom.

Coleridge, typically the literary idealist, goes one step further back, deriving "property" from the workings of "Imagination." But meditations upon the dual aspects of property as such are enough for our present purposes. In the surrounding of himself with properties that name his number or establish his identity, man is ethical. ("Avarice" is but the scenic word "property" translated into terms of an agent's attitude, or incipient act.) Man's moral growth is organized through properties, properties in goods, in services, in position or status, in citizenship, in reputation, in acquaintanceship and love. But however ethical such an array of identifications may be when considered in itself, its relation to other entities that are likewise forming their identity in terms of property can lead to turmoil and discord. Here is *par excellence* a topic to be considered in a rhetoric having "identification" as its key term. And we see why one should expect to get much insight from Marxism, as a study of capitalistic rhetoric. Veblen is also, from this point of view, to be considered a theorist of rhetoric. (And we know of no better way to quickly glimpse the range of rhetoric than to read, in succession, the articles on "Property" and "Propaganda" in *The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.)

Bentham's utilitarian analysis of language, treating of the ways in which men find "eulogistic coverings" for their "material interests," is thus seen to be essentially rhetorical, and to bear directly upon the motives of property as a rhetorical factor. Indeed, since it is so clearly a matter of rhetoric to persuade a man by identifying your cause with his interests, we note the ingredient of rhetoric in the animal experimenter's ways of conditioning, as animals that respond avidly at a food signal suggest, underlying even human motives, the inclination, like a house dog, to seek salvation in the Sign of the Scraped Plate. But the lessons of this "animal rhetoric" can mislead, as we learn from the United States' attempts to use food as an instrument of policy in Europe after the war. These efforts met with enough ill will to sug-

gest that the careful reformist tendencies as only with conservative need us a dismal rhetoric when Henry Wallace, country the genuine go lectual classes, the Geni press, as at one signal, United States and Eur What did represent us Plate, which our offici present publicly in ter dead elephant. You s resonant things; our pr last election had been a this statement unrevisio after a campaign in wh "in principle.")

In pure identification would be no strife in a battle only through a m tion possible, thus pro interchange of blows. E together, so that you can the other begins, and yo Here is a major reason opposites." When two contribute different kin ferent amounts and kin just where "cooperation other begins? The way tifically" identified; riv and their persuasiveness manul. (Where public confined to the intrinsi depend also for their e of communication, whi For a "good" rhetoric r

"communicative" as a poor rhetoric backed nation-wide by headlines. And often we must think of rhetoric not in terms of some one particular address, but as a general *body of identifications* that owe their convincingness much more to trivial repetition and dull daily reinforcement than to exceptional rhetorical skill.)

If you would praise God, and in terms that happen also to sanction one system of material property rather than another, you have forced Rhetorical considerations upon us. If you would praise science, however exaltedly, when that same science is at the service of imperialist-militarist expansion, here again you bring things within the orbit of Rhetoric. For just as God has been identified with a certain worldly structure of ownership, so science may be identified with the interests of certain groups or classes quite *unscientific* in their purposes. Hence, however "pure" one's motives may be actually, the impurities of identification lurking about the edges of such situations introduce a typical Rhetorical wrangle of the sort that can never be settled once and for all, but belongs in the field of moral controversy where men properly seek to "prove opposites."

Thus, when his friend, Preen, wrote of a meeting where like-minded colleagues would be present and would all be proclaiming their praise of science, Preen answered: "You fail to mention another colleague who is sure to be there too, unless you take care to rule him out. I mean John Q. Militarist-Imperialist." Whereat, Preen: "This John Q. Militarist-Imperialist must be quite venerable by now. I seem to have heard of him back in Biblical times, before Roger B. Science was born. Doesn't he get in everywhere, unless he is explicitly ruled out?" He does, thanks to the ways of identification, which are in accordance with the nature of property. And the rhetorician and the moralist become one at that point where the attempt is made to reveal the undetected presence of such an identification. Thus in the United States after the second World War, the temptations of such an identification became particularly strong because so much scientific research had fallen under the direction of the military. To speak merely in praise of science, without explicitly dissociating oneself from its reactionary implications, is to identify oneself with these reactionary implications by default. Many reputable educators could thus, in this roundabout way, *function* as "conspirators." In their zeal to get federal subsidies for the science department of their college or

university, they could hardly be accused of war as guiding principle.

Identifications

As regards "autonomous" identification may be said to be incapable of reduction to a single principle or to argue that it is free from identification extrinsic to it. Such a claim, from the standpoint of the field of identification extrinsic to the field of identification, is not motivated by any agent, is not motivated by any agent, however strongly this identification imagery, may affect his action in a larger unit of action. Autonomous activity's place in the field may be unconcerned. The identification of the sheep, to protect the flock, is to be "identified" with a principle.

Of course, the principle is considered irrespective of its position on either side by side in a field of identification subject are being taught. The identification, so far as its place in the most important identification is concerned, is not established at all, until later in the field interwoven with the principle. The activity itself becomes a means of surrounding the identification would be for another who is the specialty not so much a lack of gratification.

Carried into unique identification to the sheer "identifications" of identification when we concentrate upon identification. But we are clearly

the identifications whereby a specialized activity makes one a participant in some social or economic class. "Belonging" in this sense is rhetorical. And, ironically, with much college education today in literature and the fine arts, the very stress upon the pure autonomy of such activities is a roundabout way of identification with a privileged class, as the doctrine may enroll the student stylistically under the banner of a privileged class, serving as a kind of social insignia promising preferment. (We are here obviously thinking along Veblenian lines.)

The stress upon the importance of autonomous principles does have its good aspects. In particular, as regards the teaching of literature, the insistence upon "autonomy" reflects a vigorous concern with the all-importance of the text that happens to be under scrutiny. This cult of patient textual analysis (though it has excesses of its own) is helpful as a reaction against the excesses of extreme historicism (a leftover of the nineteenth century) whereby a work became so subordinated to its background that the student's appreciation of first-rate texts was lost behind his involvement with the collateral documents of fifth-rate literary historians. Also, the stress upon the autonomy of fields is valuable methodologically; it has been justly praised because it gives clear insight into some particular set of principles; and such a way of thinking is particularly needed now, when pseudoscientific thinking has become "unprincipled" in its uncritical cult of "facts." But along with these sound reasons for a primary concern with the intrinsic, there are furtive temptations that can figure here too. For so much progressive and radical criticism in recent years has been concerned with the social implications of art, that affirmations of art's autonomy can often become, by antithesis, a roundabout way of identifying oneself with the interests of political conservatism. In accordance with the rhetorical principle of identification, whenever you find a doctrine of "nonpolitical" esthetics affirmed with fervor, look for its politics.

But the principle of autonomy does allow for historical shifts whereby the nature of an identification can change greatly. Thus in his book, *The Genesis of Plato's Thought*, David Winspear gives relevant insight into the aristocratic and conservative political trends with which Plato's philosophy was identified at the time of its inception. The Sophists, on the other hand, are shown to have been more

closely allied with the "sive" from the Marxist mentally weakened by acceptance of slavery. concern with an ideal progressive trends.

During the second Y viously complained of themselves wrote books an anti-Fascist politics. Hitlerite Germans and motives which in form (Glenway Wescott's *A overgeneralized attempt all Rhetoric was abandoned criticism was itself a rhe anti-Fascist attitudes an tributed to the forming Soviet books). In the become only too account identifications that link cal and economic code questioning of "purity" from another quarter: t*

The

Science, as more inst on the nature of the s it is identified. And i human relations, we mý perverted science. Th grant that, in corrupt tin churchmen; and it is re cal training fitted them experimentally induced tional Socialist Germany tions in our own society

might we not expect similar motives to lurk about the edges of our sciences (though tempered in proportion as the sinister political motives themselves are tempered in our society, under our less exacting social and economic conditions)? But liberal apologetics indignantly resists any suggestion that aesthetic motives may lurk behind unnecessary animal experiments that cause suffering. The same people who, with reference to the scientific horrors of Hitlerism, admonish against the ingredients of Hitlerite thinking in our own society, will be outraged if you follow out the implications of their own premises, and look for similar temptations among our specialists.

One can sympathize with this anxiety. The liberal is usually disinclined to consider such possibilities because applied science is for him not a mere set of instruments and methods, whatever he may assert; it is a *good* and *absolute*, and is thus circuitously endowed with the philosophic function of *God* as the grounding of values. His thinking thus vacillates indeterminately between his overt claims for science as sheer method, as sheer coefficient of power, and his covert claims for science as a substance which, like God, would be an intrinsically *good* power. Obviously, any purely secular power, such as the applications of technology, would not be simply "good," but could become identified with motives good, bad, or indifferent, depending upon the uses to which it was put, and upon the ethical attitudes that, as part of the context surrounding it, contributed to its meaning in the realm of motives and action.

The unavowed identification, whereby a theological *function* is smuggled into a form on its face wholly secular, can secretly reënforce the characteristically liberal principle of occupational autonomy, itself reënforced by the naïvely pragmatist notion that practical specialized work is a sufficient grounding of morality. If the technical expert, as such, is assigned the task of perfecting new powers of chemical, bacteriological, or atomic destruction, his morality as *technical expert* requires only that he apply himself to his task as effectively as possible. The question of what the new force might mean, as released into a social texture emotionally and intellectually unfit to control it, or as surrendered to men whose *specialty* is *professional killing*—well, that is simply "none of his business," as specialist, however great may be his misgivings as father of a family, or as citizen of his nation and of the world. The extreme division of labor under late capitalist

liberalism having made of the state of Babel into an affront the Rhetorical principles of a specialty carries motives proper to that specialty *as such*, but not in the *context of motives*.

In sum, as regards technical consider, as a disciplinary the materials with which propounded by Rousseau come from the nature of / Yet, willy nilly, a science or social movements with new anguish, a crisis in the *of Morals*, Nietzsche met praising "autonomy" as authoritarianism, like the the autonomous specialty rhetorical concept of "in to which such doctrinaire clear the fact that one's duty for one's morality odds, a specialty at the sinister.

"Redemption"

With a culture formed of a Crucified Christ, just science, when the ways of the need for the vicarage of Or must some other person or fictive, take over the seek out a Vessel to which function, in being symbolic and collective guilt. But anti-Semitism provided the

in the post-Christian rationale of Hitler's National Socialist militarism; and we know how Jews and other minority groups are thus magically identified by many members of our society. And since we also know that there are at large in the modern world many militaristic and economic trends quite like those of Germany under the Hitlerite "science" of genocide, we should at least be admonished to expect, in some degree, similar cultural temptations. For the history of the Nazis has clearly shown that there are cultural situations in which scientists, whatever may be their claims to professional austerity, will contrive somehow to identify their specialty with modes of justification, or socialization, not discernible in the sheer motions of the material operations themselves. In its transcendence of natural living, its technical scruples, its special tests of purity, a clinic or laboratory can be a kind of secular temple, in which ritualistic devotions are taking place, however concealed by the terminology of the surface. Unless properly scrutinized for traces of witchcraft, these could furtively become devotions to a satanic order of motives. At least such was the case with the technological experts of Hitlerite Germany. The very scientific ideals of an "impersonal" terminology can contribute ironically to such disaster: for it is but a step from treating inanimate nature as mere "things" to treating animals, and then enemy peoples, as mere things. But they are not mere things, they are persons—and in the systematic denial of what one knows in his heart to be the truth, there is a perverse principle that can generate much anguish.

Dual Possibilities of Science

But one cannot be too careful here. Religion, politics, and economics are notoriously touchy subjects, and with many persons today, the cult of applied science has the animus of all three rolled into one. We should take pains to make this clear: we are most decidedly *not* saying that science *must* take on such malign identifications as it presumably has, for some scientists, when fitted into the motives of a Fascist state. In the United States, for instance, the Federation of American Scientists has been urgently seeking to dissociate the idea of atomic war power from the idea of national security. Thus, the Federation proclaimed, in a statement issued September 1, 1947, on the second anniversary of V-J Day:

Many persons have potential, implying that justification in Congress. We assert that national

paredness or the support

When men are of good v to break such sinister ide special field enables them

Unfortunately, good wi same statement goes on sound policy in the Unite there seems much justice the measures we propose superiority in this field, o proposed treaty by finding

In a speech made before sion (Sept. 10, 1947), the some paradoxes in this co proposals for giving "the r of control. He contended principle of state sovereignty for the restriction of owner greatest capitalist country a its face, the capitalist prop solution than the position

However, the history of and of political parties eve vices whereby *actual contr* ship of it. And obviously that allocated the rights s have all the advantages of he the *fictions* of ownership the *junction* of ownership. It would certainly be no n claims were here being pro the Soviet delegate was a *unmistakably* avoid such a scientists' statement as pu

"maneuvering" in our proposals, maneuvering to put the Russians in the position of seeming to delay an adequate international control over the atomic bomb, when there were strong doubts whether our own Congress would itself have agreed to any such control.

Lying outside the orbit of the scientists' specialty, there are psychological considerations which are nearly always slighted, since they involve identifications manifestly extrinsic to atomic physics in itself. Possibilities of deception arise particularly with those ironies whereby the scientists' truly splendid terminology for the expert smashing of lifeless things can so catch a man's fancy that he would transfer it to the realm of human relations likewise. It is not a great step from the purely professional poisoning of harmful insects to the purely professional blating and poisoning of human beings, as viewed in similarly "impersonal" terms. And such inducements are particularly there, so long as factional division (of class, race, nationality, and the like) make for the ironic mixture of identification and dissociation that marks the function of the scapegoat. Indeed, the very "global" conditions which call for the greater identification of all men with one another have at the same time increased the range of human conflict, the incentives to division. It would require sustained rhetorical effort, backed by the imagery of a richly humane and spontaneous poetry, to make us fully sympathize with people in circumstances greatly different from our own. Add now the international rivalries that goad to the opposite kind of effort, and that make it easy for some vocalizers to make their style "forceful" by simply playing up these divisive trends, and you see how perverted the austere scientific ideal may become, as released into a social texture unprepared for it.

The good will of scientists is not enough, however genuine it may be. There is the joke of the father who put his little son on the table and, holding out his arms protectively, said, "Jump." The trusting child jumped; but instead of catching him, the father drew back, and let him fall to the floor. The child was hurt, both physically and in this violation of its confidence. Whereupon the father drove home the moral: "Let that be a lesson to you. Never trust anyone, not even your own father." Now, when the apologists of science teach their subject thus, instead of merely exalting it, we can salute them for truly admonishing us, in being as "scientific" about the criticism of science as in the past they have been about the criticism of religion.

To sum up:

(1) We know, as a matter of fact, that science has become sinister. (2) We know, as a matter of fact, that a high percentage of Fascist scientists, even in Germany, then, should there not be, are devoted to sinister science? Pa-
show in much of our art, tions of secrecy imposed u-
a "conspiratorial" motive the great *frankness* of sci-
from the purely humanist scientific development pri-
must endanger this essential norm of *universal clarity*. Insofar as such conditions can keep it wholesome: i-
this extent, the scientist mi- of "autonomy," or if he au-
Scientific discoveries have of war. But the demand th-
tary considerations *change* dously. Scientists of gna-
morality of their specialty autonomy is denied them, from themselves the true i-

Ingenious

The thought of self-dece here. For there is a wide through the resources of i-
direction by any particular of explicit design in rheto-
extend the range of rhetori- inadequate terms which mu-
out by some skillful speak- varying degrees of delibera-
determinately self-protecti-

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