Atlas of Nazi Germany

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MICHAEL FREEMAN

Atlas of
NAZI
GERMANY

A Political, Economic and Social Anatomy of the Third Reich

Second edition

Consulting Editor to the first Edition – Tim Mason

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Foreword to first edition

Mainstream historians do not usually attach much importance to visual images. Their source materials are for the most part written documents, and they produce books which are above all to be read. To try to understand social and political history is to engage in an activity which is above all literary. It is the words which count. The illustrations contained in works of history are perhaps a little more numerous now than they were fifteen years ago, but they are still normally very few and very conventional and are in every sense separate from the text. Modern historians may use old photographs to give an impression of what people, streets, workplaces or warfare looked like, but they seldom use them as evidence or discuss their messages.

Meanwhile, new historical specialisms are arising, which, modelled, it seems, on the history of, and do indeed give appropriate importance to the history of design, of photography, the cinema and television etc., but tend to carry their subject matter away from the concerns of the general historian. Such specialists have a lot to say about how to analyse images from the past, but much less about the use of images in enhancing historical understanding. The visual component in the process of learning about the past thus tends to be underestimated and neglected all round.

In this respect, Michael Freeman's book about Nazi Germany is innovative. It is much more than an historical atlas: he has succeeded in representing most of the important themes in the political, economic and military history of the Third Reich in the form of diagrams, charts, graphs and tables, as well as of maps and photographs. These images are an integral part of what he has written on each theme. His historical summaries comment on the material, and the images document part of his exposition or argument. He has composed the book in a highly self-conscious and deliberate manner which has involved much research and a great deal of painstaking revision in order to reach the best possible relationship between text and image on each spread of pages.

The book is intended for sixth-formers, university students and serious general readers. (Those looking for another picture book on Nazi Germany should stop reading here.) And they will be among the best judges of the value of his approach. Professional experts on recent European history will find some summaries of recent research and debates, and they may also

extend their knowledge of the geography of Germany; above all, however, they may come to appreciate, as I have done, how complicated historical issues can be illuminated and clarified when they are presented as a combination of image and prose, diagram and description.

Perhaps it is helpful to give an example of this from my own work. In the past fifteen years some historians of Nazi Germany have come to attach great significance to the fluidity of the institutions of the dictatorship. The processes of decision-making and the channels of command were anything but uniform and clear, and the various ministries, party agencies, military and police authorities devoted great energy and ingenuity to competing with each other for a greater share of the expanding dictatorial powers of the regime. These conflicts probably (not every historian agrees) had a considerable influence over the policies finally sanctioned or chosen by Hitler. The relevant facts and the interpretations to which they give rise are complicated and often technical; many detailed monographs have been written around the theme, but it remains difficult to give a summary account of this aspect of the Third Reich which is intelligible to non-experts. Such accounts, my own included, are all too often congested and allusive, strenuous efforts to make language adequate to the tortuous growth processes of the regime and its policies *in general*. How much clearer all this becomes when we are presented with a series of maps and diagrams which turn 'overlapping jurisdictions' and 'confused patterns of power and responsibility' into visual realities. The abstract nouns gain enormously from being illustrated.

This is the main reason why I believe that Michael Freeman's book will be useful and instructive. He makes difficult and important topics accessible to readers who may not yet know a great deal about Nazi Germany, without in any way condescending to them in the manner typical of popularisers.

Tim Mason
Rome, September 1986

Preface to first edition

This book started life over an impromptu lunchtime discussion with David Croom in the spring of 1984. It was originally intended as a short, popular exposition on the Third Reich, but under Tim Mason's editorial eye and as a result of a certain internal momentum, it turned out to be rather more serious in intent and coverage. However, restrictions of time and money rendered it impossible to make a comprehensive search for *original cartographic* materials. None of the relevant United States archives was searched, for example. In Germany, the only repository examined was the *Bundesarchiv*, which proved to have a disappointingly restricted set of material relating specifically to the National Socialist regime, although it is clear that some items lie in special archival groups like the Speer Collection. The greater body of original cartographic sources has been found, in fact, in Oxford, in the map collections of the Bodleian Library and the School of Geography. Some of these materials were collected in the normal run of accessions, notably up to 1939. Other material was acquired relatively recently from the Directorate of Military Survey. Some also derives from the period during the war when the School of Geography was a centre of naval intelligence work, particularly for the compilation of some of the *Admiralty Handbooks*, although those covering Germany were completed in Cambridge where, unhappily, few records survive. For the rest of the book's illustrative material, it will become immediately apparent that, apart from official printed sources such as the *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, there is a heavy reliance on existing published work. The range of this is enormous and was the primary cause of the extension from one to two years in the time taken to complete the book. It is the individuals whose names are credited on the illustrations who warrant the first acknowledgement. Without their research and writing effort, the book would have been a far more difficult task. If the results of their research have been misdirected or misused in any way, I can but offer apologies and beg the chance to rectify it in later editions. Special thanks must go also to the librarians and library staffs who have assisted me in searches for literature, particularly Rosamund Campbell at St Anthony's College, Oxford, which houses a remarkable special collection on the Third Reich, and Elspeth Buxton at the School of Geography. Gordon Smith, of Keble College, Oxford, suggested various improvements to the text, particularly in those parts dealing with the war. David Croom, of Croom

Helm, has been a marvellous stimulant to the project, in material as well as in mental ways. However, my deepest gratitude must be reserved for Tim Mason, who has been ever patient, always exacting in comment and criticism, and adept at giving encouragement when interest or confidence flagged. I absolve him of all responsibility for any weaknesses in the book. It is first and foremost my own creation. But it would have been measurably inferior without his enormous fund of knowledge, his scholarship and his acuteness of perception.

The illustrations have all been drawn by Jayne Lewin, who has handled the task with characteristic patience and good sense. The transformations from author's 'roughs' into finished products have sometimes been remarkable to see.

I am also grateful to Andrew Goudie, Professor of Geography at Oxford, for the general support that he has enabled me to have in the School of Geography there. The University of Oxford also helped by making travel funds available for my research in Germany.

Michael Freeman
Oxford, September 1986

Preface to second edition

The first edition of this book was out of print in the United Kingdom within three years of its original publication. Preliminary steps were taken in 1990 for Routledge (Croom Helm's successor publisher) to produce a second edition, only to abandon the proposal a year later. It is in this context that I must thank my colleague, John Stevenson, for introducing me to Andrew MacLennan of Longman and helping to set in motion a new edition under a different imprint.

The overall format of the book has remained unchanged and the bulk of the illustrative material has been reproduced in unmodified form, except where the shift from two- to one-colour printing necessitated alterations for reasons of interpretative clarity. The principal revisions have been textual ones, to try to accommodate the continuing additions to the already vast literature of the Nazi regime. A number of sections (for example, that dealing with the war itself – Part Five) survive relatively intact. But others (for example, Part Three on Society) have been very substantially modified in the light of recent research.

The revision has been greatly helped by the formidable library resources available to me in the University of Oxford. I am grateful to Peter Hayward, Senior Cartographer at the School of Geography, who organised the reproduction of the illustrative material in one-colour form and made necessary alterations. Finally, I must thank Tim Kirk, author of *The Longman Companion to Nazi Germany*, for reading over the revised text and offering comments accordingly. The original role of consulting editor was performed by the late Tim Mason. His Foreword to the first edition is reproduced here and I must once again record the enormous measure of his input when the original book was compiled. Moreover, in making the revision, I have returned to the many notes and letters that Tim wrote in response to my various first drafts. They have been a renewed source of comment and inspiration.

Michael Freeman
Oxford, June 1994

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

BVP *Bayerische Volkspartei* – Bavarian People's Party

DAF *Deutsche Arbeitsfront* – German Labour Front

DAW *Deutsche Ausrustungswerke Gmbh* – German Armaments Works: a division of the SS organisation

DDP *Deutsche Demokratische Partei* – German Democratic Party

DEST *Deutsche Erd und Steinwerke Gmbh* – German Earth and Stone Works: a division of the SS organisation

DNVP *Deutschnationale Volkspartei* – German National People's Party

DVP *Deutsche Volkspartei* – German People's Party

EHER-Verlag – NSDAP's central publishing house in Munich

GBA *Generalbevollmächtiger für den Arbeitseinsatz* – General Plenipotentiary for Labour Allocation

Gestapo *Geheimesstaatspolizei* – Secret State Police

HJ *Hitler Jugend* – Hitler Youth organisation

KdF *Kraft durch Freude* – Strength through Joy: the leisure organisation of the German Labour Front (DAF)

KPD *Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* – German Communist Party

KRIPO *Kriminalpolizei* – Criminal Police

NSBO *Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellenorganization* – Nazi factory cell organisation

NSDAP *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei* – National Socialist German Workers' Party (Nazi Party)

NSKK *Nationalsozialistische Kraftfahrer Korps* – National Socialist Motor Transport Corps

NSV *Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt* – National Socialist Public Welfare Organisation

OKW *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* – Armed Forces High Command

RFSS *Reichsführer-SS* – Himmler's title as SS Chief

RKFDV *Reichskommisar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums* – Reich Commissar for the Strengthening of German Nationhood

RSHA *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* – Main Reich Security Office, the apex of the SS organisation

RUSHA *Rasse- und Siedlungs-Hauptamt* – SS main office for race and settlement

SA *Sturmabteilungen* – Stormtroopers: the strong-arm squads of the Nazi Party

SD *Sicherheitsdienst* – Security Service of the SS

SPD *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* – German Social Democratic Party

SS *Schutzstaffeln* – Guard detachments: more widely, the Nazis' elite formations

USCHLA *Untersuchungs- und Schlichtungs-Ausschuss* – NSDAP investigation and arbitration committee

USPD *Unabhangige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* – Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany

WVHA *Wirtschafts und Verwaltungshaupamt* – the chief SS economic and administrative office

Introduction

Almost a decade has passed since the substance of this book was first compiled.[1] In that time, what was recently unthinkable has become reality: the two Germanies are now one. The phenomenon of German division and the existence of a communist-controlled regime in the east, the German Democratic Republic, was for more than 40 years a potent reminder of the legacy of National Socialism. The dramatic collapse of that regime in 1989/90 and the subsequent movement towards unification lead some to think that the Nazi era would at last be able to pass into history. But such a view has proved naïve to say the least. The emergence of a new German national state not only raised elsewhere in Europe questions about the hegemonic potential (especially in economic terms) of a country of some 78 million people, but also threw the spotlight back on to the historical experience of the unified German state in the sense of Germans recovering a measure of historical continuity or legitimacy. The years of the Nazi dictatorship have thus re-emerged upon the contemporary agenda, dramatically enhanced at times by the protests and mob violence of Neo-Nazi groups, particularly in the east, where the ending of years of political repression has exposed the frustrations of youth, intensified in turn by the destruction of normality and the uncertain prospects of life dominated by a prosperous and powerful neighbour, the former Federal Republic.

Against this backdrop, the literature on Nazi Germany continues to accumulate in burgeoning fashion. The demise of communism has also aided this process in another sense: increasing bodies of archival materials have now become freely accessible in ways that were not so before. The literature, too, remains – as was remarked upon in the book's first edition – characterised by intense and often bitter controversy. Nowhere was this apparent than in the *Historikerstreit*, a battle or quarrel about the Germans' understanding of their history which raged in the German press over 1986 and 1987.[2] This centred upon attempts to historicise or relativise the Nazi past and upon the resulting accusations of trivialisation that such efforts brought, particularly in relation to the Holocaust. Some commentators have since come to regard the *Historikerstreit* as superfluous,[3] in that it merely reflected, if in particularly acutely contested form, what were already recognised as long-standing questions in the writing of history, of Nazi history especially. According to Kershaw, these comprise three basic

dimensions: historical–philosophical, political/ideological, and moral.[4] They help to explain why, as the first edition of this book remarked, surveys of the historiography of the Third Reich take the appearance of a never-ending Agatha Christie novel. The succession of events and processes continues to be re-examined, re-sorted and re-located to make for new readings of the plot such that any intelligible dénouement becomes steadily more remote. Kershaw, in his latest exhaustive, if exhausting, account puts it more simply: 'there appears . . . to be an inverse ratio between the massive extension of empirical research on the Third Reich and the embodiment of such research in full-scale synthesis'.[5] For the scions of postmodernism, of course, this signals nothing unsatisfactory. As Harvey records: 'Post-modernism swims, even wallows, in the fragmentary and the chaotic currents of change as if that is all there is.'[6] Lyotard's 'incredulity towards metanarratives' invites dismissal of projects which seek 'synthesis'.[7] The myriad interpretations of and perspectives on the Third Reich offer, in the mould of Derrida, for example, their own distinctive discourse.[8] Not unrelated to the issues of postmodernism is the crisis of representation that has been noted in the social sciences and the humanities.[9] Williams thus attempts to explicate the environmental history of the Black Mountains using the novel form, reconstituting a life-world in which the narrative account is presented from above and below in a manner which does not really admit of closure except in so far as the reader determines.[10] There are senses in which one can see such works as Christabel Bielenberg's *The Past is Myself*[11] or Thomas Keneally's *Schindler's List*[12] as in part echoing the form in the context of knowledge of the Third Reich.

The present book might be viewed as a further experiment in representation in that it seeks to provide a *graphic* account of the outward face and the inward structures of the Third Reich. It tries to portray the Third Reich in ways which provide an immediacy of communication that is achieved only with much more difficulty in the consecutive form of prose. It is a remarkable, and in this writer's view, disconcerting feature of the vast body of the literature on the Third Reich that it is so lacking in graphic representation. Broszat's penetrating and convincing analysis, *The Hitler State*, for example, confines its graphic presentation to Nazi election performance, a single linkage diagram on party-state relations, and tables on the sociological structure of party membership and on political and other crimes.[13] Hidden in both text and footnotes, though, is much statistical and other material which, if it could have been suitably presented, would have lent a greater immediacy and clarity to many of the facets being analysed. The argument may be put that the complexity and constant state of flux of so many structures and organisations of the Third Reich make invalid any semi-formal articulation of them. But the obverse of this argument is that such features lend even greater force to some form of graphic presentation. It may be the case that, metaphorically speaking, the movement of the chess pieces on the board steadily reconstitutes the rules of the game, but this does not render any less valid the identification of the pieces, or of their pattern on the board at any one time and the circumscribing effects that result.

It is not just with 'graphicacy', though, that this book is concerned. More fundamentally, it attempts to expose some of the geographical dimensions of

the Third Reich. This does not mean the compilation of some sort of 'place' inventory – although there are elements of this, for example the case of the expanding economic organisation of the *Schutzstafflen* or SS. Nor does it primarily focus on distributional patterns in space, although once again there are examples of this, as in Part Four. It refers most of all to what has come to be described as the dialectics of space. Whereas it has been conventional in western marxism to think only of the dialectics of time, more recently there has been a concern to address the ways in which space forms an active not a passive construct in social production and reproduction. Space is no longer treated as 'the dead, the undialectical, the immobile'.[14] Capitalism sustains itself not just through such mechanisms as time-space annihilation, but through occupying space in the search for renewed means of accumulation.[15] Capitalism, in effect, yields its own *historical geography* as parts of the landscape are successively valued, devalued and revalued in the circulatory ferment.[16] For a state which left the forces of economic production, particularly industrial production, very largely in the hands of private business, the Third Reich forms an apt subject for such a perspective. This can be conceived not just in terms of the familiar thesis that territorial annexation and conquest from 1938 onwards represented an outward resolution of the crises of capital that the Nazi state was undergoing by this time.[17] It can be related also to the internal resolutions or workings of capital, either within the area constituting the Greater German Reich or in the more extended realms of SS domination. There were, for instance, windfall profits to be made in the east through the aryanisation of Jewish businesses and the use of forced labour.[18] This naturally acted to deflect capital away from traditional but less profitable foci of industrial enterprise in areas like the Ruhr.[19] The acquisition of standing iron and steel capacity through annexation and conquest likewise had implications for traditional investment centres, including those which flowed from policies of autarky.

In considering the dialectics of space, however, it is not just upon capital that the focus should rest. It is necessary to look more broadly at the fabric of power, in particular to the four primary power blocks that propelled the Third Reich on its brief historical course: the army, the SS, the state and the Party. Not only is it an essential part of any analysis of the Third Reich to examine the relations and alliances of these blocks and the way the influence of one or other altered as the war progressed, for instance. It is also vital to consider the incongruencies and tensions that flowed from the differing spatial structures through which their powers were exercised. The Third Reich exhibited some remarkably dissonant administrative field systems, as Part Two will endeavour to show.

The most startling geographical feature of the Third Reich was undeniably the scale of its territorial extension and areal conquest. By 1942 it constituted one of the most rapidly made land empires in history. It was over 3,200 kilometres from the German naval bases on the west coast of France to the Russian front in the Don Basin. The furthest longitudinal extent of Versailles Germany was only about 950 kilometres, and even that distance was interrupted by the Polish corridor. The resource value of such a land base for an advanced industrial state like Germany was formidable. But advanced capitalist economies are not made from the simple accumulation

of coal, mineral and manufacturing bases, however numerous. They are created, too, through the emergence of complex lineaments of communication, from the working out of myriad systems of comparative advantage, involving production linkages and trading reciprocities of multitudinous form. This provided one of the major difficulties under which the expanded Third Reich laboured. Already in 1939 the communications system of Germany proper (the Altreich) was strained from the expansions and re-orientations that Hitler's re-armament and autarkic policies imposed upon the economy.[20] With the territorial annexations of that period and, later, territorial conquests, the problems intensified. Of course the regime could utilise the communications systems of annexed or occupied territories (though much less easily in Russia, where the wider railway gauge was a severe impediment), but these, and more critically the structures of trade relations, had evolved in the context of largely independent national development. They did not readily interlock into a new style of European industrial economy which was targeted towards German needs and the German core area, following a neo-colonial system of resource assemblage. The Reichsbahn was soon to register these strains as locomotives, rolling stock and manpower was eked out over an increasingly diffuse network and as trans-European line-hauls accumulated in number and scale as the war progressed.[21] The extensive autobahn system that Nazi planners envisaged for central Europe offered a potential solution, but the German autobahn system itself remained very incomplete at the outbreak of war and the completed sections, anyway, were equivocally economic in their objective.[22] Given the Third Reich's transport problems, one would have expected autobahn construction to have been given some priority after 1939; in practice, new construction was almost entirely abandoned.[23]

The exigencies of war, of course, wove their own pattern into these difficulties of resource transfer and assembly. The war fronts required a continuous stream of supplies and materials, food and men. Where attrition formed the primary mould of combat, the front became a bottomless sink into which materials and men were poured. So as trainloads of requisitioned resources and conscripted foreigners rumbled into Germany from former countries of Europe and from Russia, there was a counter-stream of troops and weaponry.

As the Third Reich evolved, therefore, especially after 1936, it was attempting to forge entirely new sets of spatial relations, but it was never fully able to realise or service these, and in this respect it can be argued that distance produced its own tyranny. To borrow the terminology of Le Febvre, Nazi 'representations of space' came into collision with standing 'spatial practices'.[24] Moreover, time proved too short to remould the diverse economic-industrial bases of the annexed and conquered territories into a unitary pan-German system and to evolve a complementary profile of communication and trade infrastructures. The way the traditional dominance of the Ruhr was maintained to the very end of the war demonstrates the regime's relative bankruptcy in remodelling the European economic-industrial realm to meet its purposes more clearly, notwithstanding the legendary efforts of Speer's war ministry to systematise the utilisation of annexed and conquered resource groupings. The Ruhr's position was a very

evident strategic weakness, as 1944 and 1945 were to prove.[25] But it also became progressively sub-optimal in location terms as the frontiers of the Reich expanded. The development of a more easterly industrial complex, on the scale of the Ruhr, would have made real sense in terms of the economics and logistics of location. But this ascribes to the Third Reich a dominance of economic purpose which was manifestly absent. Economic optima and economic consistency were frequently and increasingly compromised by ideological designs. In this way, thousands of skilled Jews were deported from vital German and Polish war factories mid-way through the war for extermination in death camps like Auschwitz.[26] But even in its progressive drive to liquidate Europe's Jews, the regime was caught in the same distance web as that experienced in the economic-industrial system. SS demands for deportation trains to serve points as far afield as south-west France and southern Greece merely exacerbated the Reichsbahn's many problems. And it was not just through racial ideology that economic efficiency was compromised. As Peukert has recorded, there was no over-arching role for the state in economic management. The Nazi era effectively saw the 'privatisation' of the state – as state bodies were given quasi-private economic functions and private firms were accorded quasi-state powers.[27] Goering's Four-Year-Plan Organisation exemplified the former, the chemical giant, I-G Farben the latter. The outcome, according to Peukert, was 'a welter of jurisdictions and responsibilities'.[28]

As the Third Reich grew in areal extent, posing all kinds of problems of spatial re-integration on a Europe-wide scale, it was upholding concepts of territory and maintaining maladjusted systems of territorial administration which could only frustrate the difficulties.[29] The singular power of Party Gauleiters, in the style of territorial chieftains, was quite alien to the operation of an advanced industrial state. Speer and his armaments ministry soon found this out to their cost when efforts were begun to harness industrial production more clearly towards the needs of war.[30] In the Gauleiters' view, their territories were not intended to be subservient to any central or Reich authority. The interests of the local party and the well-being of the local population were their primary and sovereign concerns, not the wider workings of the German state, either in peace or in war. Similar centrifugal or divergent tendencies were characteristic of occupied territories where Party strongmen sometimes wielded even greater powers than their counterparts in the Reich proper. The Reichskommissariat of the Ukraine under Erich Koch (contemporaneously Gauleiter of East Prussia) was a particular case in point. And the occupied territories presented an entirely separate problem in the way each displayed variant patterns of government.[31] In this sense, Hitler's great land empire was more a loose federation under the over-arching eye of his leadership than a clearly regulated, purposive colonial realm.

The administration of Germany proper and, later, of the Greater German Reich presented another series of limitations. It was not only the 'Gau-kingdoms' which distracted from orderly *national* government, but the way so few departments of Reich administration operated congruent administrative field systems, a feature that the rapid breakdown of cabinet government tended to cement. Even more critically, none of these systems

bore any relationship to the Party Gaue, which were modelled on the Reichstag electoral districts of the 1920s and left largely unchanged until the end of the war. To add to this complexity, moreover, the military operated its own distinctive regional system which was later replicated in the SS. Then there were still the remnants of the Länder which, although emasculated of separate political power in the *Gleichschaltung* of spring 1933, remained as bases for the administration of education and other social services. The outcome was thus a veritable maze of overlapping and often conflicting jurisdictions, as Part Two demonstrates. The Nazi practice, too, of appointing regional Party leaders to approximately parallel state offices added to the confusion rather than reducing it. Some Gauleiters, for example, quickly seized this as a pretext for pursuing their own designs by claiming direct Führer-authority over and above the traditional administrative apparatus of the state.

The quasi-feudalism of the Nazi Gauleiters, along with, for example, the absurd images of medieval chivalry cultivated in higher echelons of the SS,[32] reflected, in a deeper sense, what some have come to regard as one of the most fundamental tensions of modern capitalism: the persistent breaking up of place, of environment-bound traditions, as the forces of capital constantly re-make geographical space.[33] It is in this respect that one can begin to understand the apparent contradiction of a machine state, combining all the latest in science and technology, becoming allied to a racial myth grounded on German soil and in historical legend. The 'Blood and Soil' syndrome, so beloved of Nazi propagandists, can be construed as an attempt to anchor German society in a world that appeared to many to be in a constant state of flux. The achievements of German capitalism in the later nineteenth century were not echoed in the first third of the twentieth. Compounded by defeat in war, German capitalism underwent a succession of crises. It was not just that the lower middle classes saw their savings evaporate in the great inflation but that the entire structure of work and business seemed to be increasingly insecure to many eyes. Thus was born a reactionary modernism which sought to unite not divide class groupings and to do so by invoking the will of the state via the production of an all-embracing social myth.[34] According to Harvey, Heidegger based his allegiance to the principles if not the practices of Nazism on the rejection of universal machine rationality as the basis for modern living, proposing instead a 'counter-myth of rootedness in place and environmentally-bound traditions'.[35] For Heidegger, this was the means to security in a turbulent world. In such a context, the especially reactionary form that constituted National Socialism represented one pathway (albeit devastatingly tragic) towards realisation of Heidegger's project. It was a pathway which carried with it much of the baggage of geopolitical theory, but it has to be understood within the wider framework of the capitalist imperative. As Geiss reminded the antagonists of the *Historikerstreit*, concepts of centre and periphery form an indispensable category of study in the Nazi period.[36] So even for some historians, the dialectics of space cannot be escaped.

If the Third Reich was so riddled with discordant and disintegrative tendencies, whether deriving from the processes of capital, the particular exigencies of war, or the insane demands of racial ideology, it is hard to

avoid leaning towards the functionalist or structuralist view of the Third Reich as advocated by Broszat,[37] among others. In fact, it is largely this perspective that informs the present book. Some would argue, of course, that there is, in any case, no credible basis to an intellectual perspective which seeks to *synthesise* diverse views of the nature of the Third Reich. Different or competing interpretations cannot be understood outside of their relational frames or contexts. In geographical terms, few observers can fail to be struck by the way the Nazi empire was endeavouring to make far-reaching alterations to the relationship of the German productive machine to the geographical environment. Policies of economic autarky, areal annexation and conquest, the logistical demands of war on two fronts and an increasingly fractured political dominion, all conspired to make the friction of distance, the dialectics of space, into a stark restricting frame. This was no *tabula rasa*, in other words. And grandiose plans for continental autobahns and super broad-gauge railways offered little compromise.

Notes

1   Freeman, M. (1987). *Atlas of Nazi Germany*. London; New York.

2   See Knowlton, J. and Cates, T. (1993) (trs). *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ.

3   See Fest, J. (1993). Postscript, 21 April 1987, in Knowlton and Cates, op. cit. *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler*, p. 264.

4   Kershaw, I. (1993). *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*, 3rd edn. London.

5   Ibid., p. 209.

6   Harvey, D. (1989). *The Condition of Postmodernity: an enquiry into the origins of cultural change*. Oxford, p. 44.

7   Quoted in ibid., p. 45.

8   Ibid., p. 51.

9   See, for example, Berg, D. (1993). Between modernism and postmodernism. *Progress in Human Geography* **18**: 494–5.

10   Williams, R. (1988/1990). *People of the Black Mountains* (2 vols). London.

11   Bielenberg, C. (1968). *The Past is Myself*. London.

12   Keneally, T. (1993). *Schindler's List*. London. (Originally published in 1982 as *Schindler's Ark*.)

13   Broszat, M. (1981). *The Hitler State: the foundation and development of the internal structure of the Third Reich*. London. (Originally published in German in 1969 as *Der Staat Hitlers*.)

14   See Soja, E. (1989). *Post-modern Geographies: the reassertion of space in critical social theory*. London, pp. 10–11, quoting Foucault.

15   See, for example, Smith, N. (1984). *Uneven Development: nature, capital and the production of space*. Oxford, p. 117 ff.

16   See Harvey, D. (1982). *The Limits to Capital*. Oxford, p. 373 ff.

17   See the account in Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship* pp. 52–3, 75–7.

18   The industrialist Oskar Schindler, as recounted in Thomas Keneally's book (see note 12), in many ways encapsulates the trend.

19   See Gillingham, J. R. (1985). *Industry and Politics in the Third Reich: Ruhr coal, Hitler and Europe*. London.

20   See Matthews, H. P. S. and O'Mahony, P. (1939). *Germany in April 1939.* Unpublished report in the Library of Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics Part II: 25–7; see also Robbins, M. (1979). The Third Reich and its Railways. *Journal of Transport History* **5** (new series): 83–90.

21   On 15 December 1942, 54 out of 260 trains crossing German frontiers outwards were locomotive coal trains. See Robbins, *The Third Reich.*

22   See Overy, R. J. (1973). Transportation and re-armament in the Third Reich. *Historical Journal* **16**: 389–409.

23   Ibid.

24   Le Febvre, H. (1991). *The Production of Space.* Oxford, p. 36 ff.

25   See Milward, A. S. (1965). *The German Economy at War.* London, ch. 7; in 1944, of the 166 million tons of German coal production, nearly 111 million were mined in the Ruhr – see Gillingham, *Industry and Politics*, p. 58.

26   See Mason, T. (1972). The primacy of politics – politics and economics in National Socialist Germany. In Turner, H. A. (ed.). *Nazism and the Third Reich.* Oxford, p. 195.

27   Peukert, D. J. K. (1989). *Inside Nazi Germany: conformity, opposition and racism in everyday life.* London, p. 44.

28   Ibid.

29   See Broszat, *The Hitler State*; also Caplan, J. (1977). The Politics of Administration: the Reich Interior Ministry and the German civil service. *Historical Journal* **20**: 707–36.

30   See Milward, *The German Economy at War*, pp. 153–5.

31   See Kirk, T. (1994). *Longman Historical Companion to Nazi Germany.* London, pp. 146–50.

32   Burleigh, M. and Wippermann, W. (1991). *The Racial State: Germany, 1933–45.* Cambridge, pp. 272–4.

33   See Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, chs 2 and 5.

34   One of the best accounts of the perspective discussed here is Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany.*

35   Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, p. 35.

36   Geiss, I. (1993). On the Historikerstreit. In Knowlton and Cates, *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler*, pp. 256–7.

37   Broszat, *The Hitler State.*

Prelude

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