

# KANT

paul guyer



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# Kant

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Paul Guyer

# Kant

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## Abbreviations

Citations to Kant's texts are given parenthetically. Citations from the *Critique of Pure Reason* are located by reference to the pagination of Kant's first ("A") and/or second ("B") editions. All other passages from Kant's works are cited by the volume and page number, given by arabic numerals separated by a colon, in the standard edition of Kant's works, *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Royal Prussian, later German, then Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences, 29 volumes (volume 26 not yet published) (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900–). Where Kant divided a work into numbered sections, his section number typically precedes the volume and page number. These references are preceded by abbreviations from the following list, except where the context makes that unnecessary. Unless otherwise indicated in the individual essays, all translations are from the *Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*, edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992–).

CB	"On the Conjectural Beginning of Human History" (1786)
CF	<i>Conflict of the Faculties</i> (1798)
Corr	Kant's correspondence, in volumes 10-13 of the Academy edition or in Zweig (see Bibliography)
CPJ	<i>Critique of the Power of Judgment</i> (1790)
CPracR	<i>Critique of Practical Reason</i> (1788)
CPuR	<i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> (1781 and 1787)
DDS	"Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space" (1768)
DSS	<i>Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics</i> (1766)
FI	First Introduction to the <i>Critique of the Power of Judgment</i> (post-humous)

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× **Abbreviations**

G	Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785)
ID	Inaugural dissertation, <i>On the Forms and Principles of the Sensible and Intellectual Worlds</i> (1770)
LEC	Lectures on Ethics, Moral Philosophy Collins (dated 1784-85, but based on lectures from several years earlier)
LF	<i>On the True Estimation of Living Forces</i> (1747)
Logic	Immanuel Kant's <i>Logic: A Handbook for Lectures</i> , edited by G.B. Jäsche (1800)
MFNS	Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786)
MM	Metaphysics of Morals (1797)
MMV	Lectures on Ethics, Metaphysics of Morals Vigilantius (1793-94)
NE	<i>A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition</i> (1755)
NF	Notes and Fragments
NFey	Naturrecht Feyerabend (1784-85)
NQ	"Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Quantities into Philosophy" (1763)
OFBS	<i>Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime</i> (1764)
OP	<i>Opus postumum</i> (1797-1803)
OPB	<i>The Only Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God</i> (1763)
OT	"What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thought?" (1786)
PFM	<i>Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that will be able to come forth as a Science</i> (1783)
PM	<i>The Employment in Natural Philosophy of Metaphysics combined with Geometry, of which Sample I Contains the Physical Monadology</i> (1756)
PNTM	<i>Inquiry concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals</i> (1764)
PP	<i>Toward Perpetual Peace</i> (1795)
RP	<i>What is the Real Progress that Metaphysics has made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff</i> , edited by F.T. Rink (1804)
R	Reflexionen (Kant's notes and marginalia in volumes 14-20 and 23 of the Academy edition)
RBMR	<i>Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason</i> (1793)
TP	"On the old saying: That may be correct in theory but is of no use in practice" (1793)
UH	"Idea towards a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View" (1784)
UNH	<i>Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens</i> (1755)
WE?	"Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" (1784)

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## Chronology

- 1724** Kant born on April 22 in Königsberg, Prussia
- 1730-32** Attends elementary school at *Vorstädter Hospitalschule*
- 1732-40** Attends the Pietist *Collegium Fredericianum*
- 1740-46** Attends the *Albertina*, the university at Königsberg; left without degree
- 1748-54** Employed as private tutor by families in Judtschen, Arnsdorf, and Rautenberg
- 1749** Publishes *True Estimation of Living Forces*
- 1754** Return to Königsberg; publishes “Whether the Earth Has Changed in its Revolutions” and “Whether the Earth is Aging from a Physical Point of View”
- 1755** Receives M.A. for “On Fire”; earns right to lecture as *Privatdozent* with *A New Exposition of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition* and begins lecturing; publishes *General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*
- 1756** Publishes doctoral dissertation on *Physical Monadology*; three essays on Lisbon earthquake and essay on the theory of winds
- 1757** Announces lectures on physical geography
- 1758** Publishes “New Doctrine of Motion and Rest”
- 1759** Publishes “Essay on Optimism”
- 1762** Publishes “The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figure”
- 1763** Publishes *Only Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God* and “Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy”
- 1764** Declines professorship of poetry; publishes *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* and *Inquiry concerning the istinness*

- of the *Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, second-prize essay in Berlin Academy competition
- 1766** Adds position as sublibrarian at the castle and university library; publishes *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics*
- 1768** Publishes “On Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space”
- 1769** Declines offer of professorship at Erlangen
- 1770** Declines offer from Jena; appointed Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at Königsberg; defends and publishes inaugural dissertation *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World*
- 1772** February letter to Marcus Herz outlines project of a critique of pure reason; begins anthropology lectures; gives up position as sublibrarian
- 1775** Essay “On the Different Human Races” as announcement for anthropology lectures
- 1776** Essay on the educational philosophy of the Dessau Philanthropinum
- 1778** Declines professorship in Halle
- 1781** *Critique of Pure Reason* published in May
- 1782** First, negative review of *Critique* appears
- 1783** Responds in *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*
- 1784** Essays on “The Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View?” and “What is Enlightenment?”
- 1785** Publishes *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, review of Herder’s *Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Mankind* and essays on “Volcanoes on the Moon,” “The Wrongful Publication of Books,” and “The Definition of the Concept of a Human Race”
- 1786** Publishes *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, essays on “Conjectural Beginnings of the Human Race” and “What Does Orientation in Thinking Mean?”; serves for the first time as rector of the university and becomes external member of the Berlin Academy of the Sciences
- 1787** Second edition of *Critique of Pure Reason*
- 1788** Publishes *Critique of Practical Reason* and “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy,” which continues debate on race
- 1790** Publishes *Critique of the Power of Judgment* and defense of his philosophy from polemic by J.A. Eberhard, “On a discovery

- that is to make all new critique of pure reason dispensable because on an older one”
- 1791** Publishes “On the Failure of All Attempts at a Theodicy”
- 1792** Publishes essay that will become Part I of *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason*
- 1793** Publishes whole *Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason*, essay “On the Old Saying: That may be correct in theory but it is of no use in practice”
- 1794** Prohibited from publishing further on religion; elected to Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg
- 1795** Publisher *Toward Perpetual Peace*
- 1796** Publishes “On a newly elevated tone in philosophy”; gives final lecture on July 23
- 1797** Publishes *Metaphysics of Morals* and “On a presumed right to lie from philanthropic motives”
- 1798** Publishes *The Conflict of the Faculties and Anthropology from a Practical Point of View*
- 1800** Publication of *Kant’s Logic*, edited by B.G. Jäsche
- 1802** Publication of *Kant’s Physical Geography*, edited by F.T. Rink.
- 1803** Publication of *Kant’s Pedagogy*, edited by Rink.
- 1804** Dies on February 12; publication of *What Real Progress has Metaphysics made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?*, edited by Rink



### **NATURE AND FREEDOM**

Perhaps the most famous words that Immanuel Kant wrote during a publishing career of more than fifty years are these from the conclusion to his 1788 work on the foundation and possibility of morality, the *Critique of Practical Reason*:

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: **the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me**. I do not need to search for them and merely conjecture them as though they were veiled in obscurity or in the transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence. The first begins from the place I occupy in the external world of sense and extends the connection in which I stand into an unbounded magnitude with worlds upon worlds and systems of systems, and moreover into the unbounded times of their periodic motion, their beginning and their duration. The second begins from my invisible self, my personality, and presents me in a world which has true infinity but which can be discovered only by the understanding, and I cognize that my connection with that world (and thereby with all those visible worlds as well) is not merely contingent, as in the first case, but universal and necessary. The first view of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my importance as an **animal creature**, which after it has been for a short time provided with vital force (one knows not how) must give back to the planet (a mere speck in the universe) the matter from which it came. The second, on the contrary, raises my worth as an **intelligence** infinitely through my personality,



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## 2 Kant

in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent of animality and even of the whole sensible world, at least so far as this may be inferred from the purposive determination of my existence by this law...

(CPracR, 5:161–2)

With these dramatic words, Kant alludes to the two great problems and accomplishments of his philosophical career. On the one hand, he wants to know how we who as creatures are a mere part of nature can discover how all of nature, even those parts of it that are well beyond our physical reach, does and even must work: how is it that we can become certain of the fundamental principles of everyday experience and natural science and by their means gain ever increasing knowledge of the natural order? On the other hand, he wants to display the unconditional value that we have as rational rather than merely natural beings, to show that the fundamental principle of morality is nothing but the necessary and sufficient condition of realizing this unconditional value, and that we are always free to act in accordance with and indeed for the sake of this principle, thus free to realize the unconditional value for which we unlike anything else in nature have the potential.

However, Kant's confidence in our complete freedom to live up to the demands of morality seems to be irreconcilable with his conception of the fundamental laws of nature: Kant understands our freedom to choose to act in accordance with the moral law as an ability to act in any set of circumstances as that law requires, no matter what our past behavior or even present inclinations might suggest we will do in such circumstances; but at the same time he understands the laws of nature as fully deterministic, so that the condition of nature at any one time entails its condition at any subsequent time, including our own behavior as objects within nature, with as much rigor as the premises of a syllogism logically entail its conclusion. But for Kant, this conflict, which would undermine not only our confidence in our ability to understand nature but also our motivation to attempt to live up to the demands of morality, can be avoided, for the only philosophical theory that can explain how we can know the deterministic laws of nature also allows, contrary to all appearances, that at its deepest level our own conduct is not dictated by those laws, but can be governed by pure practical reason and the moral law that is its only adequate expression. This theory is Kant's equally famous and controversial doctrine of "transcendental idealism." According to transcendental idealism, we can know the fundamental laws of nature with complete certitude because they are not descriptions of how things are in themselves

independently of our perception and conception of them, but are rather the structure that the laws of our own minds impose upon the way things appear to us<sup>1</sup> – and the laws of the mind themselves are not hidden mysteries that can be discovered only by the empirical researches of psychologists or neuroscientists, but can readily be discovered by every normal human being competent at elementary arithmetic, geometry, and logic. But precisely because the most fundamental laws of nature are in fact only our own impositions on the appearance of reality, we can also believe that our own choices, contrary to their appearance, are not governed by the deterministic laws of nature, but can be freely made in accordance with and for the sake of the moral law. At the same time, Kant will argue, the very “fact of reason” (as he calls it) that we are free to act for the sake of and in accordance with the moral law also implies that we are free to flout it, and thus that the possibility of doing evil is equally fundamental to the human will as the possibility of doing right, thus that all human beings are at risk of doing evil not because of the original sin of some distant ancestors but because of the radical nature of freedom itself.

Kant thus argues that the only possible explanation of our certitude about the theoretical laws of nature also leaves room for the efficacy of practical reason, that is, the freedom to act in accordance with the moral law, although not for any certitude that we will so act, for such a certitude would conflict with the most fundamental fact about freedom itself. But now it looks as if Kant has avoided a conflict between nature and freedom, between science and morality, only by making them irrelevant to each other, or by dividing our own characters and placing us in two parallel universes: in one realm where our actions are as fully determined by antecedent events and deterministic laws as anything else in nature is, but in another, in some sense underlying realm where our choices are completely free even though they somehow manifest themselves in appearance as if they had been seamlessly caused by antecedent events.

It may seem as if Kant was content with such a radically dualistic view of human action, but ultimately he was not. For after he had argued in his first great work, the *Critique of Pure Reason* of 1781 (substantially revised in 1787), that our own imposition of the fundamental laws of nature upon appearance leaves open at least the possibility of freedom at a deeper level of reality, and then added in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (*CPracR*) (1788) that our awareness of our obligation to live up to the demands of the moral law implies not merely the possibility but the actuality of our radical freedom at this deeper level, Kant wrote a third great work, the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (*CPJ*) (1790), precisely in order to bridge:

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#### 4 Kant

[the] incalculable gulf fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of the concept of the freedom, as the supersensible, so that from the former to the latter (thus by means of the theoretical use of reason), no transition is possible, just as if there were so many different worlds, the first of which can have no influence on the second.

Such a gulf, the idea that the realms of nature and of morality are basically two different worlds that do not really influence each other, is unacceptable, for what morality itself requires is that the “second” world of morality “**should** have an influence on the former,” that is, on the world of nature:

namely the concept of freedom should make the end that is imposed by its laws real in the sensible world; and nature must consequently also be able to be conceived in such a way that the lawfulness of its form is at least in agreement with the possibility of the ends that are to be realized in it in accordance with the laws of freedom. – Thus there must still be a ground of the **unity** of the supersensible that grounds nature with that which the concept of freedom contains practically, the concept of which . . . makes possible the transition from the manner of thinking in accordance with the principles of the one to that in accordance with the principles of the other.

(CPJ, Introduction, section II, 5:175–6)

What Kant is assuming here is that morality is not just a matter of making rightful or virtuous choices, but also requires us to put those choices into practice by attempting to realize the goals or ends that they entail in the arena of action, that is, nothing less than the realm of spatial, temporal, and causal nature in which we live and act. Kant then embarks upon an extended argument that we can experience the existence of natural beauty, of works of artistic genius that are themselves products of a creative spirit that is as much natural as rational, and of the marvelous organization that we find in organisms within nature and then project onto the whole of nature, as palpable confirmation of our theoretical assumption that nature must be a realm in which the ends that we choose in the name of morality can be realized.

In the third Critique Kant also suggests that his two apparently opposite conceptions of human action can be bridged by recognizing that there are not just two but three forms of human autonomy, the third of which unifies the first two. Autonomy is the central conception of Kant’s moral

philosophy, where he defines it as “the property of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition)” (G, 4:440). The central argument of Kant’s moral philosophy is that such autonomy, as the ability to choose the principles and ends of our actions freely rather than having them imposed upon us by the inclinations and desires that we may merely happen to have, is our most basic value, but that the only way to free ourselves from domination by such inclinations is by adopting a purely formal law of action, which can be nothing other than the law that our maxims of action must be universally acceptable – Kant’s famous principle of universalizability. But in the third Critique, Kant goes further and suggests that the fundamental principle of *each* of our three main cognitive powers – theoretical understanding, practical reason, and the power of judgment – can be understood as a form of autonomy. He writes:

In regard to the faculties of the soul in general, insofar as they are considered as higher faculties, i.e., as ones that contain an autonomy, the understanding is the one that contains the **constitutive** principles *a priori* for the **faculty of cognition** (the theoretical cognition of nature); for the **feeling of pleasure and displeasure** it is the power of judgment, independent of concepts and sensations that are related to the determination of the faculty of desire and could thereby be immediately practical; for the **faculty of desire** it is reason, which is practical without the mediation of any sort of pleasure, wherever it might come from, and determines for this faculty, as a higher faculty, the final end, which at the same time brings with it the pure intellectual satisfaction in the object.

(CPJ, Introduction, Section IX, 5:196–7)

The full meaning of this passage can hardly be apparent yet, but a preliminary interpretation suggests this much: The solution to the central problem of theoretical philosophy is to recognize our fundamental cognitive autonomy, that is, that we ourselves are the authors of the most basic laws of nature, and for that reason can know them with certainty. The key to moral philosophy, as already suggested, is the recognition that our *practical* autonomy can only be achieved and sustained by our free adoption of the moral law, a law that stems from our own practical reason and is not imposed upon us by some external agency any more than the fundamental laws of nature are. But the moral law, as it turns out, is not merely negative, imposing upon us only the restriction of not acting on principles that are not universally acceptable; it also imposes upon us the positive

objective of promoting the particular ends that people freely choose in the exercise of their autonomy, the collective realization of which would be the “final end” or “highest good” consisting of the maximal distribution of human happiness consistent with and indeed resulting from the maximal realization of human virtue. And our experience of natural beauty and organization, a form of experience in which we take pleasure independently of any immediate cognitive or practical concern, gives us emotionally powerful confirmation of the realizability of this final end in nature. But such an experience of pleasure can itself be understood as a form of *affective* or we might even say *emotional* autonomy: a pleasure that does not arise from the satisfaction of any immediate cognitive or practical concern, although at the same time it also suggests to us that nature is hospitable to our most general cognitive and practical objectives. In other words, the autonomous pleasure that we take in the experience of natural beauty and organization supports our otherwise purely rational conviction of the realizability of our theoretical and practical autonomy.<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, Kant did not wait until the third *Critique* to signal that the transcendental idealist resolution of the apparent tension between the determinism of nature and the freedom of human action, which seems to assign determinism and freedom to two parallel universes, is not his last word on the subject. Late in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he wrote that:

All interest of my reason (the speculative as well as the practical) is united in the following three questions:

- 1 What can I know?
- 2 What should I do?
- 3 What may I hope?

(CPuR, A 804–5 / B 833)

Transcendental idealism is supposed to have provided the answer to the first two of these questions: What I can *know* with certitude is the fundamental laws of nature (although never all of its concrete detail) because these laws are nothing but the laws of human thought itself, accessible to me as a normal human being. What I should *do* is what the moral law that is given to me by my own reason and not by any external authority commands, and I am assured of the possibility of my freedom to act as that law demands by transcendental idealism but also assured of the actuality of my freedom by my sense of obligation to so act. But what I may *hope* is nothing less than that I can realize the ends enjoined upon me by the moral law in the world

of nature, or that I may transform the natural world into a “moral world,” “the world as it would be if it were in conformity with all moral laws (as it **can** be in accordance with the **freedom** of rational beings and **should** be in accordance with the necessary laws of **morality**)” (CPuR, A 808/B 836). From the start of his mature thought, in other words, Kant insisted that the free choice to do what morality requires of us is not unrelated to the natural world, but imposes objectives on us that can only be realized in the natural world, and which we must be able to hope can be realized in that world if we are coherently to act as morality commands us at all. What the third Critique adds to this is only the argument that we may use our experience of natural beauty and organization as a certain kind of emotional support for the plausibility of this hope.

Kant clearly liked his reduction of the problems of philosophy to these three questions, for he repeated them in the very last work to be published in his name in which he still had a hand, the textbook on logic edited under his supervision by his student Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche in 1800. But here Kant added a fourth question to the three listed in the first Critique. “The field of philosophy in this cosmopolitan sense,” he wrote, that is, the sense in which philosophy “is in fact the science of the relation of all cognition and of all use of reason to the ultimate end of human reason, in which, as the highest, all other ends are subordinated, and in which they must all unite to form a unity,” “can be brought down to the following questions”:

- 1 What can I know?
- 2 What should I do?
- 3 What may I hope?
- 4 What is the human being?

(Logic, 9:25)

By adding the question “What is the human being?” to his list, Kant hints at the underlying theme of his answer to the first three questions: what I can know is the framework of nature that is dictated by the laws of human thought, and then an indefinite extent of the infinitely many particular facts of nature that can be discovered within that framework; what I should do is act in accordance with the principle of autonomy that is dictated by no other authority than human practical reason itself, and work at the open-ended project of realizing human happiness within the framework of mutual freedom demanded by this principle; and what I may hope is that this project can be realized in nature as we encounter it, a hope about which

the distinctively human experiences of natural beauty and organization give us some vital confirmation. The human being, in other words, is nothing less than the source of natural and moral law as well as of the experience that assures us that these two forms of legislation are mutually consistent.

In his waning years, Kant worked ceaselessly, although ultimately in vain, to complete a final book that would give full expression to this vision of the human being as the source of the laws of nature, the moral law, and of an experience of nature that exhibits the ultimate unity of these two forms of legislation. He died leaving only a mass of notes toward this book, the so-called *Opus postumum*. But among these notes we find drafts of title pages such as these:

The Highest Standpoint of Transcendental Philosophy in the System of Two Ideas,

By

God, the World, and the Subject which connects both Objects,  
the Thinking Being in the World.

God, the World, and what unites both into a System:

The Thinking, Innate Principle of the Human Being (*mens*) in the World.

The Human Being as a Being in the World, Self-limited through Nature  
and Duty.

(OP, 21:34)

In these notes, Kant makes it clear that by “God” he ultimately means nothing more than an idea that is the projection of the dignity of our own power to legislate the moral law – “There is a God,” he writes, “not as a world-soul in nature, but as a personal principle of human reason” (OP, 21:19) – and that by “Nature” he means the ordering of our experience in accord with fundamental laws that are the projection of our own laws of thought. So it is the “thinking, innate principle of the human being” that is the source of both the laws of nature and the laws of morality, and in the end we cannot but experience ourselves as living in a world in which nature and morality are not only compatible but also mutually reinforcing. Or so at least Kant fervently hoped until his dying day.

## SKEPTICISM AND CRITIQUE

This vision of the human being as the source of the laws of nature, the moral law, and of an experience of nature in which these are both compatible and cooperative is the substance of Kant’s philosophy, which we shall

pursue here through an exposition of his three great critiques and their companion texts, the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786) in the case of the first Critique and the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797) in the case of the second, as well the series of essays on human history and religion, especially the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (1793), in which Kant attempted to bring these apparently refractory domains of human experience into his own unifying vision of the efficacy of practical reason in nature. But there is also a methodological theme that runs throughout Kant's philosophy, namely the defense of his "critical" vision from the Scylla and Charybdis of "dogmatism" and "skepticism" as well as from the yawning abyss of "indifferentism" (see CPuR, A ix–x), and our exposition of Kant's philosophy will have to attend to his methodological as well as to his substantive concerns.

We already have a sense of what Kant's "critical" approach to philosophy involves, namely an examination of the human powers of cognition and reason as the basis for all claims about the laws of nature and morality. And it is not too difficult to say what Kant means by "dogmatism" and "indifferentism." The former is an uncritical assertion of laws for nature and morality, that is, a confident assertion of the truth of such laws that is not grounded in an antecedent critique of human intellectual powers, which inevitably results in the assertion of conflicting dogmas about many of the most important matters of human concern; and indifferentism is simply the indifference to philosophical questions that the spectacle of unending dogmatic conflicts can all too readily produce. But to say what Kant means by skepticism and how he proposes to combat it is a more complicated matter.

In the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant writes:

[I]t always remains a scandal to philosophy and universal human reason that the existence of things outside us (from which we after all get the whole matter of our cognitions) should have to be assumed merely on **faith**, and that if it occurs to anyone to doubt it, we should be unable to answer him with a satisfactory proof.

(B xxxix)

Doubt about the provability of the existence of objects distinct from but related to our own representations is what we think of as Cartesian skepticism, and even though Kant does not mention the name of Descartes here,



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