

THE CONCISE  
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF  
**WESTERN  
PHILOSOPHY &  
PHILOSOPHERS**



Edited by  
J.O. URMSON &  
JONATHAN RÉE

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PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHERS

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# The Concise Encyclopedia of WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHERS

New edition, completely revised  
*Edited by*

**J.O.Urmson and Jonathan Rée**



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## INTRODUCTION

The very idea of an encyclopedia of philosophy is a bit embarrassing. Some people may fancy, from time to time, that they have achieved an encyclopedic grasp of the problems of philosophy. But all you ever get from an actual encyclopedia is a little knowledge about the personalities and problems which make up the **history of philosophy**. And this little knowledge will be enough to convince most people of one thing: that philosophy is such a jumbled and controversial subject that encyclopedic philosophical ambitions are symptoms of megalomania rather than expressions of wisdom.

The first edition of this *Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers* came out in 1960, and it now has the status of a minor classic. Part of its attraction was that none of its large team of contributors disguised their individual voices for the sake of encyclopedic unison. Nevertheless, the majority of these forty nine authors had a common philosophical allegiance: like their editor, **J.O.Urmson**, they were participants in what many would regard as the Golden Age of twentieth-century English philosophy—the “linguistic” movement centered in Oxford in the 1950s, which was inspired by the later **Wittgenstein**, and advocated by **Austin**, **Hare**, **Strawson**, and above all **Ryle**. (See also **Analytic Philosophy**.) The main thing that united the Oxford philosophers was their ambivalence about the project of philosophical analysis, particularly as interpreted by **logical positivism**. They admired its intellectual unsentimentality and its terse, hard-edged prose; but they rejected its cut-and-dried scientism and its faith in technicalities and formal logic, and they felt uneasy about its condescension towards the classics of philosophy. As one observer of Oxford in the 1950s put it, philosophy was “the subject which now spends its time debating whether it was once correct to describe it as Logical Positivism”.

Whatever else one may think of this episode in the history of English philosophy, it was a good moment for compiling an encyclopedia. Urmson’s editorial policy, as explained in his Introduction to the first edition, was based on the assumption that “there are no authorities in philosophy”, and that “there is no set of agreed results”. So he made his Encyclopedia into an incitement to



thinking as well as a store of information. Readers could consult the articles on **rationalism** and **empiricism**, for example, to get a straightforward guide to two schools whose disagreement is supposed to structure the whole field of philosophical debate; but if they turned to the magisterial article on epistemology they would be told that “their tug-of-war lacks a rope”. With the second printing (1967), moreover, readers found initials at the end of each article identifying its author: in the case of Epistemology and several others, it was Ryle himself. Hare wrote on **ethics**; Strawson on **metaphysics**; Ayer on **Russell**; Dummett on **Frege**; Williams on **Descartes**—to cite only a few examples. And Urmson had extracted perfect miniature samples of their work from his celebrated authors: the result was a remarkable philosophical anthology, as well as an Encyclopedia. Teachers also found that it served well as a textbook for introducing new students to philosophy.

Another of Urmson’s objectives was to “range beyond the confines of British and American philosophical fashions”. Here too, he had some notable successes: Kaufmann’s articles on **Hegel** and **Nietzsche** are classic sources for his famous if tendentious interpretations; in his article on **Husserl**, Findlay was able to air his views about “the strange drop from Phenomenology to Existentialism”, and Farber gave a characteristically eccentric interpretation of **phenomenology**.

This new edition reproduces most of Urmson’s Encyclopedia, edited and updated where necessary. I have removed about one tenth of the original articles though, either because they are obsolete, or because they are preposterous (like Kaufmann’s notorious piece on Heidegger, which concluded, without argument, that “there are probably few philosophers to whose vogue Andersen’s fairy tale *The Emperor’s Clothes* is more applicable”).

This venerable material from the original edition is now supplemented with 80 new articles\* from 31 authors. Some of the additions concern things that have happened in philosophy in the past thirty years; others take account of new ideas about old topics; several deal with political or literary aspects of philosophy which might have seemed to the first editor to be of little importance; but most of them have to do with **psychoanalysis**, Marxism and traditions in European continental philosophy which would not have been regarded as intellectually legitimate by English philosophers in the 1950s.

The initials at the end of each article can be decoded by reference to the lists of contributors on p. iv. Initials enclosed in round brackets indicate that the article is a survivor from the first edition; those in square brackets indicate that it is new. So readers can easily tell whose point of view they are being offered, and whether it belongs to the 1950s or the 1980s.

My aim has been to collect the widest range of perspectives on Western Philosophy and Philosophers which could be explained to non-specialist readers, and squeezed into a pocketable book. This Encyclopedia is not meant to resolve questions about the nature of philosophy and its encyclopedias though; in fact it will succeed only if it sharpens them.

Jonathan Rée

*June 1988*

**Note:** Cross references are indicated by **bold type**, for first references only.

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\* Adorno, "African Philosophy", Alienation, Althusser, Analytic Philosophy, Anderson, Animals, Anscombe, Applied Ethics, Arendt, Atomism, Bachelard, de Beauvoir, Benjamin, Bentham, Bloch, Canguilhem, Chomsky, Davidson, Deleuze, Derrida, Dialectical Materialism, Dilthey, Duhem, Dummett, Feuerbach, Foot, Foucault, Frankfurt School, Gadamer, Gender, Gramsci, Habermas, Heidegger, Hermeneutics, History of Philosophy, Holism, Horkheimer, Humanism, Ideology, Intentionality, Kierkegaard, Kojève, Kripke, Kuhn, Lacan, Lenin, Levinas, Lukács, MacIntyre, Marcuse, Marx, Merleau-Ponty, Metaphor, Modernism, Modernity, Nozick, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Political Economy, Political Philosophy, Post-modernism, Psychoanalysis, Quantum Mechanics, Quine, Rawls, Realism, Relativism, Relativity, Religion, Ricoeur, Rorty, Sartre, Saussure, Schelling, Smith, Structuralism, Transcendental Arguments, Urmsen, Weil.

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PHILOSOPHERS

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# A

**Abelard**, Peter, (c. 1079–1142) born in Brittany, France. The details of his stormy life are to be found in the autobiographical letter known as the *Historia Calamitatum*. Most famous of all the events of Abelard's life is his seduction of Héloïse, niece of the Canon Fulbert of Notre Dame; when their child was born they married secretly but Héloïse's brothers broke into Abelard's room at night and castrated him. Subsequently Héloïse became a nun and Abelard a monk.

Abelard is noted in the history of philosophy for his ability as a **dialectician** and for his contribution to the problem of **Universals**. He studied **logic** under Roscellinus, a nominalist master, and later disputed with the realist theologian William of Champeaux in Paris. The details of this debate, together with an account of the successive positions taken up, are to be found in Abelard's logical treatises *Concerning Genera and Species* and *the Glosses on Porphyry*.

Abelard stands firmly by the principle that only individuals exist and that universal terms, being more than mere names, get their meaning from the abstractive power of the mind. The famous formula that the mind may consider factors separately without considering them as separate from one another gave a convenient dialectical answer to the question as it was raised by **Boethius**.

Abelard also wrote an ethical treatise, *Know Thyself*, which emphasizes the subjective element in human conduct and stresses the importance of intention in the moral qualification of an action.

(J.G.D.)

**Adorno**, Theodor W. (1903–1969), born in Frankfurt; along with Max **Horkheimer** and Herbert **Marcuse**, a major architect of the **Frankfurt School** of Critical Theory. Besides his work in philosophy Adorno was also active as a musicologist (he was student of Alban Berg, and throughout his life a defender of the work of Arnold Schoenberg), sociologist, and literary critic and theorist.

Adorno's most important philosophical works are *Negative Dialectics* (1966) and *Aesthetic Theory* (1970). In *Negative Dialectics* he argues that dialectics must be freed from the totalizing impulse of Hegel's system because the whole of present day society is not a reconciliation of universal and particular, but the domination of particularity by the universality of subjective reason, determined

solely by the drive for self-preservation. Subjective reason conceives of knowing as the mastery of things by concepts, where nothing is cognitively significant except what different items share, what makes them the “same”. The rule of identity and sameness is realized not only in the philosophical systems of German **idealism**, but also, materially, in capitalism where all use values (particularity) are dominated by exchange value (universality).

Negative dialectics is dialectics without a final moment of unification; its goal is to reveal the non-identity of an item and the concept under which it is usually “identified”. Negative dialectics operates for the sake of the object of cognition. For Adorno cognitive utopia would not be a unified science, but a use of concepts to unseal the non-conceptual without making it their equal.

In *Aesthetic Theory* Adorno argues that the kind of non-identity thinking aimed at by negative dialectics is, for the time being at least, adumbrated in modernist works of art. Successful works of art claim us beyond our ability to redeem their claims conceptually. They are particulars demanding acknowledgement while simultaneously resisting being fully understood or explained: in fact it is their unintelligibility which reveals the wounding duality between particularity and universality in modern rationality. Art pre-figures what it would be like to comprehend individuals without dominating them. For Adorno modernist art enacts a critique of subjective reason, and reveals the possibility of another form of reason.

Other noteworthy philosophical works by Adorno are: *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947) (written with Max Horkheimer); *Kierkegaard: The Construction of the Aesthetic* (1933); *Against Epistemology: a Metacritique* (1956) (on **Husserl**); *The Jargon of Authenticity* (1964) (on **Heidegger**); *Three Studies on Hegel* (1963); and *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life* (1951). See also **Philosophy of Science**.

[J.M.B.]

**Aenesidemus**, *see* Stoics.

**Aesthetics**. Though the division of philosophy into a number of departments has little theoretical value, aesthetics has long been regarded as one of the main departments of philosophy alongside logic, metaphysics, the theory of knowledge and ethics. The word “aesthetics” itself is little over two centuries old and results from a German coinage by the philosopher Baumgarten; thus though the word is ultimately derived from the Greek word *aisthesis* which means “perception”, no weight can be put on this etymology. Where we now speak of aesthetics earlier writers would have spoken of the theory of taste or criticism of taste. The *Hippias Major* of **Plato**, in which the sophist Hippias vainly attempts to provide **Socrates** with a satisfactory definition of beauty, is the oldest surviving work in the field of aesthetics and there is a continuing literature from that period.

Aesthetics gains its subject-matter from the fact that people are constantly judging things, whether natural objects, products of the “fine arts” or other man-made articles, to be beautiful, sublime, charming, ugly, ridiculous or uncouth;

moreover, they attempt to support or question such judgments and fall into argument about them. The philosophical problems of aesthetics arise from reflection on these data; it will be helpful to list some of them without discussion. What have terms like “beautiful”, “sublime”, “charming”, “ugly”, got in common with each other that they do not share with “worthy”, “useful”, “wicked” and “right”? What is the difference between “beautiful” and “sublime”? How, if at all, can we show judgments of aesthetic merit to be true or justify one view rather than another? How does aesthetic appraisal differ from ethical and economic appraisal? What is a work of art? Can we have the same aesthetic attitude to works of art as to natural phenomena?

It is natural to find a close parallel between the problems of aesthetics and those of **ethics**. Some would indeed regard it as a mistake, however natural; others would maintain that to speak of a parallel is an understatement and hold that we should start with a general theory of value to be applied with slight modifications to the field of ethics, aesthetics and economics. The most important question of ethics is naturally expressed in some such way as: “Is there any standard of morality beyond the conventions of a group and, if so, what is it?”. We can equally naturally ask whether there is any standard of aesthetic judgment and, if so, what it is. This being the case, it is not surprising to find a close parallel between the most common aesthetic and ethical theories. As the ethical **relativist** claims that moral beliefs hold only for an individual or a group so it is claimed that there is no criterion of good taste save that conventionally accepted within a group; as the ethical **hedonist** finds moral worth solely in the production of pleasure, so the aesthetic hedonist claims that the production of pleasure is the sole criterion of aesthetic merit; as some moralists say that goodness is an ultimate moral quality objectively present in things of value, so some have claimed that beauty is an objective quality; similarly we have subjectivist and emotivist theories of meaning in both fields.

The most influential classical discussion of aesthetics was that of **Kant** in his *Critique of Judgment*, especially through his insistence on the preconceptual level of the aesthetic judgment and the formal character of the criteria of aesthetic merit. The precise form of his discussion depends on his view that judgments differ in quantity, quality, relation and modality, so that the problem of aesthetics is mainly to say how aesthetic judgements differ in these four ways from others. In the twentieth century, the best-known theory is that of **Croce** in his *Aesthetics*, to which that of **Collingwood** in his *Principles of Art* is essentially similar; for Croce the work of art is a sensuous intuition of some emotion of which it is also an adequate expression, the canvas, the written words or the sounds being mere causal aids to others to have the same intuition. The view put forward in **Cassirer's** *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, especially as restated in S.K.Langer's *Feeling and Form*, has also been very influential. It is common to these views to see aesthetic experience as essentially expression, or symbolism, of feeling, and to connect it as such with all use of language and other symbolism; Croce indeed regards general linguistics and aesthetics as one and the same thing. These

theories, idealist in tendency, have not gained much support from **analytic philosophers**, but these have notably failed to provide any alternative.

Some philosophers, indeed, deny the possibility of any general aesthetic theory; aestheticians, they say, assume that there is some common feature of experience of all the diverse arts and of natural beauty, and that there is some general criterion of judgment to be found which will be applicable in all these fields; but this assumption they consider to be without any justification. We can say, they hold, what makes us admire this painting, that landscape or that symphony, but we must not expect there to be anything common to all these cases. Whether this extreme scepticism is justified or not, it must be admitted that aesthetics, more than any other branch of philosophy seems doomed either to a pretentious vagueness or to an extreme poverty which make it a poor step-sister to other main fields of philosophical inquiry. See also **Adorno**.

(J.O.U.)

**“African Philosophy”**. The concept of African Philosophy originated as a variant of the general idea of “Primitive” Philosophy, which in its turn is part of the history of European attempts to understand the strange practices of “other peoples”. In *Primitive Culture* (1871) the English anthropologist E.B.Tylor (1832–1917) postulated a childish but coherent world-picture called “animism”, which he took to be at the basis of “primitive society”. Animism, for Tylor, was a rudimentary scientific theory which attempted to explain natural phenomena by attributing them to the voluntary acts of personal spirits; it was not an arbitrary invention, but a special if naive application of the principle of causality. In this sense Tylor’s approach was intellectualist: he went beyond purely emotional factors, such as fear, upon which previous analyses of “primitive culture” had focused, in order to identify its conceptual foundations.

This intellectualist approach did not necessarily involve a rehabilitation of “primitive” culture or an affirmation of cultural equality. “Primitives” were still primitive, “savages” still savage. For Tylor’s intellectualism was a form of evolutionist sociology, in which inequalities of development were seen against a background assumption of the ultimate identity of humanity as a whole. Thus it contrasts, on the right hand, with theories of absolute difference, which fragment the idea of “the human race” into several different “races”; and on the left, with the principled egalitarianism which regards actual inequalities of achievement as historical accidents, which do not detract in any way from the equal value of all cultures and peoples.

Tylor drew extensively on **Comte’s** theory that the history both of the individual and of humanity as a whole passes from a theological stage, through a metaphysical one, to a positive or scientific stage. Comte had regarded each of these three stages as based on a specific “philosophy”, and held that their historical succession exhibited a progressive acceptance of the limits of human understanding. Thus theology, for Comte, was the earliest and most ambitious form of philosophy. It too had developed in three stages: fetishism, polytheism, and monothism. Fetishism—the habit of treating inert objects as though they

were alive—was thus the absolute beginning of reason. However, according to Comte every member of every society has to go through all the same stages, and moreover no society and no scientific system, however highly developed, could break completely with its origins. So Comte insisted on the functional value of fetishism, as the stage of the initial stirring of conceptual exploration, which left its mark on all subsequent ones.

Tylor, in contrast, saw fetishism (or animism, as he re-named it) as an absolutely backward mentality, present in primitive societies but completely overcome in civilized ones. However even Tylor's intellectualism came to be criticized for being excessively generous towards primitive cultures. In *How Natives Think: Mental Functions in Inferior Societies* (1910), the French philosopher Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1939) complained that the idea of “animism” made the unjustified assumption that “savages” are capable of rudimentary logical thought, so that they are essentially the same as the “civilized adult white man”. Lévy-Bruhl suggested that savages are pre-logical and separated from Europeans by a gulf as large as that between vertebrate and invertebrate animals.

The French writer Raoul Allier reached very similar conclusions, on the basis of reports and letters written by Protestant missionaries. In *The Psychology of Conversion amongst Uncivilised Peoples* (1925) and *The Uncivilised Peoples and Ourselves: Irreducible Difference or Basic Identity?* (1927), Allier also challenged the idea of a universal human nature, and described the intellectual methods of “savages” as “para-logical”. On this basis he argued that when uncivilized individuals were converted to Christianity they underwent a total crisis, which gave them access not only to a new faith, but to a new humanity.

There was then a reaction against prelogicism and para-logicism, and a well-meaning revival of intellectualism. Thus in *Primitive Man as Philosopher* (1927) the American anthropologist Paul Radin (1883–1959) described the role of intellectuals in “primitive society” in order to discredit the myth that “primitive man” is totally submerged in society, dominated by the thinking of the group, and lacking individual personality. The French ethnographer Marcel Griaule (1908–1956) pursued a similar task with the Dogon of French Sudan (now Mali). He did his best to efface himself as a theorist, and to act as little more than a secretary, recording, transcribing and translating the statements of some “master of the spoken word”. (See for example his *Conversations with Ogotemmêli*, 1948.) With the discovery of “oral literature”, numerous other investigators, including many Africans, have taken the same approach as Griaule.

In this context, “primitive philosophy” means an explicit set of doctrines, rather than the merely implicit animism postulated in Tylor's *Primitive Culture*. But the Dogon cosmogony which was expounded with elaborate beauty by Ogotemmêli is more like a magnificent poem than an exercise in abstract, systematic, critical analysis. It is not clear why it should be categorized as “philosophy” as opposed to, for example, “religion” or “mythology”.



Some of the more ardent exponents of this approach therefore attempted to go behind the actual words of their informants in order to reconstruct another, more systematic and philosophical discourse upon which they could be taken to depend. Thus *Bantu Philosophy* (1945), by the Belgian missionary Placide Tempels, depicted a specifically Bantu ontology involving a dynamic conception of the universe based on the idea of complex, stratified plurality of forces. This ontology, he said, contrasted with the static concept of Being; characteristic of scholastic Aristotelianism, which predominated in Europe; and he presented the doctrine in a systematic, deductive form which looks distinctly philosophical. Tempels also argued for the theological conclusion that God has always been present to Bantu thought in the guise of a supreme force. This had important implications for his “missiology” (theory of missionary activity): Allier was mistaken in conceiving of conversion as a total crisis and breakthrough into a new type of humanity; it was a return to the real meaning of authentic Bantu thought, peeling away historical accretions to discover an original revelation of the divine.

But Tempels’ generous conception of Bantu philosophy could also be seen as an expression of colonialist condescension. He admitted that the Bantu themselves were not capable of formulating “Bantu philosophy”, but claimed that when the ethnologist articulated it for them, they recognized it immediately as representing their own view. But this clearly suggested that their thought was not originally philosophical, but became so only thanks to outside intervention. It is not surprising that in the *Discourse on Colonialism* (1950), Aimé Césaire denounced Tempels for inviting colonists to respect the philosophy of the Africans rather than their rights.

Nevertheless a number of later authors, mostly Africans, have followed Tempels in trying to reconstitute “African Philosophy”, or, more cautiously, the philosophy of some particular group of Africans, or “African thought” generally. The theory of negritude developed by Léopold Senghor, from the word coined by Césaire, is closely related to this idea of “African philosophy”; so too are the works of the Rwandan writer Alexis Kagamé (1912–1981) (*The Bantu-Rwandan Philosophy of Being* (1956) and *Comparative Bantu Philosophy* (1976)).

The trouble with all these investigations is that they are based on an antiquarian conception of philosophy, as something which belongs essentially to the past: they are uncritical attempts to restore a philosophy which is supposed to be already given, a collective world-view passively shared by a whole society. They are exercises in what has been called “ethnophilosophy”, rather than philosophy itself. Unfortunately, the positive, factual and historical assumptions of ethnophilosophy still dominate African philosophy; but happily they do not have a monopoly.

The alternative is to take the idea of African philosophy more literally, so that it means the contributions which African thinkers make to the sorts of critical and reflexive discussions in which philosophy has traditionally been taken to consist. Then the European history of African philosophy could be replaced by

an African history of philosophy, with philosophy defined by its simple if subversive insistence on truth (which of course does not exclude, but on the contrary presupposes being rooted in a historical situation and responding to the extra-philosophical problems of one's society). African philosophy in this sense has a long history—certainly longer than that of ethnophilosophy. More and more Africans are rejecting philosophical antiquarianism as a manipulative impoverishment of the past: they are refusing to reduce African culture to pure traditions emptied of movement and controversy. Knowledge of old African cultures is no longer the necessary starting point for African philosophy; and it is certainly not the last word. See also **History of Philosophy, Religion**.

[P.J.H.]

**Albert the Great** (1206–1280), also known as Albertus Magnus, Albert of Lauingen and Albert of Cologne; canonized in 1931. Born at Lauingen in Swabia, Albert studied at Padua, where he joined the Dominicans; later he became Bishop of Ratisbon. He taught at Cologne and Paris. Traveller, administrator, theologian, he was an indefatigable experimentalist, especially in botany and zoology. His temper was not unlike that of his contemporary, Roger **Bacon**, who held him in grudging respect. He wrote of **Aristotle** with great sympathy. With his pupil Thomas **Aquinas**, he led the movement which installed in Christian thought an Aristotelianism specifically new to the patristic tradition. But he was the less synthetic and impersonal thinker of the two, though he was more encyclopedic and syncretic. He wrote on Aristotle in the older style of paraphrase and digression, and is closer to **Avicenna** than to **Averroes**. His feeling for the Neoplatonism of Dionysius and Proclus descends through his disciples—Ulrich of Strasbourg, who died in 1277, and Dietrich of Freiburg, who died in 1310—to Master Eckhart, John Tauler and the Dominican mystics of the Rhineland.

(T.G.)

**Alembert**, Jean le Rond d' (1717–1783), French mathematician, *see* Encyclopedists.

**Alexander**, Samuel (1859–1938), an Australian by birth. As an undergraduate at Oxford he was brought up in the **idealist** tradition of that period. But he became one of the most noted **realist** metaphysicians of his time. He was for many years Professor of Philosophy of Manchester University.

Alexander's great work was *Space, Time and Deity* (1920). The basic stuff of the universe is space-time or pure motion, and everything in it develops out of the primary stuff by a process of emergent evolution. Things or substances are volumes of space-time with a determinate contour; low in the scale of evolution is matter, whence emerges life and finally, so far as we are concerned, mind; but no one can say what will emerge later in the evolutionary process. The next stage to which the universe is striving is at that stage deity; God is in the making but never actual. On this metaphysical foundation, Alexander built a realist theory of knowledge.

(J.O.U.)

**Alienation.** Strictly speaking, to alienate something is to separate it from oneself or disown it. But an extended concept of alienation has gained wide currency in twentieth-century philosophy and social theory. Under converging influences from **existentialism**, the **Frankfurt School**, **humanism** and **psychoanalysis**, the term “alienation” has been used in numerous diagnoses of the maladies of something called “the modern world”. All sorts of alleged symptoms of “**modernity**”—the dichotomies of civilization and barbarism, scientism and irrationalism, town and country, mental and manual labour, atheism and religiosity, individualization and massification, banal popular culture and unintelligible high culture, intellect and feeling, masculine and feminine etc.—have been en-compassed within theories of alienation.

Superficially, alienation refers to a subjective feeling of unease, dissociation or exile. At a deeper level, it indicates a kind of structure, in which people find it impossible to “identify” with the social and spiritual conditions of their existence. Ultimately it implies that modernity is the loss or disruption of an original unity, and may also suggest that a day of reconciliation in a “higher unity” is about to dawn.

But alienation is not supposed to be a catastrophe striking humanity from outside; it is essentially a perverted, malign, and self-destructive expression of human creativity itself. Alienation means that people are subject to an oppression which is—though they may not recognize it—of their own making. In this sense Mary Shelley’s story of Frankenstein and his monster provides an exact allegory of alienation.

The concept of alienation achieved popularity as the basis for an alternative to **dialectical materialism** in the philosophical interpretation of Marxism. Humanistic Marxists such as **Marcuse**, **Sartre**, and the psychoanalyst Erich Fromm (1900–1980) used the term to translate the German words *Entfremdung* and *Entäus-serung*, with particular reference to the young **Marx** and his philosophy of labour or *praxis*. In the *1844 Manuscripts* (published in 1932) Marx tried to explain capitalism, or rather “the system of private property”, as a form of “alienated labour”. As Marx acknowledged, this explanation was indebted to **Feuerbach**, who had argued in *The Essence of Christianity* that “religion is the dream of the human mind” and that the God which people worship is nothing more than their own “alienated self”, inverted and unrecognized. According to the young Marx, the function of labour in modern society is just like that which Feuerbach attributed to worship in **religion**: it creates the power which confronts and overwhelms it. Hence “the *alienation* of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, an *outside* existence, but also that it exists *outside* him, **independent** and alien, and becomes a self-sufficient power over against him—that the life he has lent to the object confronts him, hostile and alien”. Moreover, in Marx’s theory money itself plays the part of Feuerbach’s humanly constructed God: it is “the visible deity, the transformation of all human and natural qualities into their opposites”; thus, “the *divine* power of money resides in its nature as the alienated,

externalised and self-estranging *species-being* of humanity: it is the alienated *power* of human beings”.

Some Marxist commentators (notably **Althusser**) believe that the theory of alienation is only a regrettable vestige of pre-Marxist ideology. Nevertheless numerous traces of it are to be found in Marx’s *Capital*, for example in its doctrine of “commodity fetishism” and in its criticisms of bourgeois theorists like **J. S. Mill** for “the folly of identifying a specific *social relationship of production* with the thinglike qualities of articles”. **Lukács’** *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) was the first work to interpret Marxism in terms of alienation or rather “**reification**”. Later, Lukács followed the theme back to **Hegel**, arguing in *The Young Hegel* that alienation is “the central philosophical concept of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*” (see also **Kojève**). The concept is also at work in **Rousseau’s** social theory, and may indeed be traced much earlier: perhaps it can even be detected in the theology of **neo-Platonism** (see also **Plotinus**) and in **pre-Socratic** doctrines of creation. For the idea that humanity is at odds with itself, and adrift from its spiritual home, is probably co-extensive with religion in general; in which case “modernity” must be considerably older than is commonly supposed.

[J.R.]

**Althusser, L.** (1918–), born in Algeria, is best known for his writings from 1960 onwards, the main theme of which was a re-working of Marxist orthodoxy and an associated defence of the scientific status of historical materialism. Using ideas derived from French historical **philosophy of science** and from **structuralism**, Althusser argued that **Marx’s** early works, with their “**humanist**” and “**historicist**” philosophical basis, should be regarded as “pre-scientific”. Later writings such as *Capital* could then be read as containing the elements of a new “scientific” problematic in the theory of social formations and their transformations. Human individuals were to be understood not as the self-conscious sources of their social life, but rather as “bearers” of a system of social relations which exists prior to and independently of their consciousness and activity. In opposition to economic reductionism, Althusser argued for a recognition of the relative autonomy of political, cultural and intellectual practices within a loosely defined “determination in the last instance” by economic structures and practices.

This notion of “relative autonomy”, together with Althusser’s insistence upon the irreducible complexity of social contradictions and struggles, made it possible for a new significance to be given to cultural analysis and to forms of resistance not directly attributable to “class struggle”. However, Althusser’s “scientism”, and his apparent denial of autonomous human agency led to a growing division between Althusser and his younger, more radical followers. Althusser’s response was a spate of self-critical writings which appeared to put an end to what was distinctive in the school of Marxist philosophy which he had engendered.

[T.B.]

**Analysis.** “Analysis” is a Greek word, meaning the resolution of a complex whole into its parts. It is opposed to synthesis, which means the construction of a whole out of parts.

Philosophers have always had two main aims, the construction of systems of **metaphysics, logic** or **ethics** (synthesis) and the clarification of important ideas (analysis). These cannot always be sharply distinguished, since what is synthesis from one point of view is analysis from another. **Plato’s Republic**, for example, may be considered as the construction in thought of a perfectly just society or as the analysis of the idea of a just society. Large parts of **Aristotle’s Ethics** are concerned with the analysis of such important ideas as “voluntary action”, “virtue and vice”, “pleasure”, etc.

In recent times continental philosophy has tended to be synthetic and British philosophy to be analytic. For **Descartes** the analysis of concepts was only a preparation for the construction of a system of knowledge based on the “clear and distinct ideas” obtained by analysis; and **Spinoza** sought to construct a view of the world deduced, on the geometrical model, from a small number of definitions and axioms. British philosophers, on the other hand, have tended to be suspicious of constructive metaphysics and to be more concerned with the analysis of thought and experience into their fundamental elements.

Since the beginning of this century the view that analysis is either the whole, or the most important part, or the distinguishing feature of philosophy has been widely accepted in English-speaking countries. Philosophers who follow this trend often have little in common with each other except the use of the word “analysis” to describe their various activities. All that can be said about their view of the function of philosophy—and even this is not wholly true—is that they take it to be, not the acquisition of new knowledge (which is the function of the special sciences), but the clarification and articulation of what we already know. Three main stands can be detected in the practice of analysis:

(1) **G.E. Moore** questioned an assumption that metaphysicians have been prone to make and which was certainly made by the **idealists** who at that time dominated British philosophy. This was that we do not know all the ordinary humdrum things about the world that we claim to know. Some had said that these things are actually false; others, that even if they were true we could not know them to be true. The world, as it appears to the plain man, is mere appearance; reality is something recondite, wholly unlike what we take it to be, and to be discovered only by profound researches conducted in some new technical language. Against this, Moore held that for the thinker such truisms as that he has a body, that he was born some years ago and that he has existed ever since, are not only true but can be known for certain to be true. Nevertheless he had no wish to assert that metaphysical theories which contradicted these assertions were merely outrageous falsehoods. They were certainly that; but they were also mistaken attempts to answer very genuine and puzzling questions. Briefly, though we cannot seriously doubt the truth of such ordinary statements and though we know, in a sense, what they mean, we may not be able to state

clearly and precisely *what* they mean. We do not, in his words, “know their proper analysis” and almost all his philosophical activity was devoted to discovering the proper analysis of propositions whose truth cannot seriously be doubted.

To give the proper analysis of a concept or proposition is to replace the word or sentence which is normally used to express it by some other expression which is exactly equivalent to it and at the same time less puzzling. An analysis, therefore, is a sort of definition, a kind of equation with the puzzling expression, the *analysandum*, on the left-hand side and the new expression, sometimes called the *analysis*, sometimes the *analysans*, on the right. Now most of the ideas that seem to need this sort of clarification are highly complex and the very word “analysis” implies the splitting of a complex form, or replacing an expression that stood for a complex concept by a longer expression that lays bare its hidden complexity. Moore seems to have used this technique with no other aim than that of clarifying our concepts; he had no metaphysical theory and did not suppose that the things mentioned in the analysis were in any sense more real or fundamental than those mentioned in the *analysandum*. How, indeed, could they be, if the *analysandum* and the analysis were to refer, as they must, to exactly the same things?

(2) **Bertrand Russell** practised the same sort of definitional analysis as Moore, but for very different reasons and with very different aims. Where Moore sought only clarity and never wished to depart from common sense beliefs, Russell sought metaphysical truth and was quite willing to say with the Idealists that common sense beliefs can be false and ordinary language wholly inadequate as a means of discovering and expressing truth. As a metaphysician, his aim was to give a general account of the universe. His account was the exact opposite of that of the Idealists. They had claimed that only reality as a whole (the absolute) was wholly real; particular things were abstractions from this totality and, as such, only partially real or not real at all. Russell’s picture of the world was that of a world composed of “atomic facts”, corresponding to each of which there would be a true “atomic statement”.

Consider the statement “it is either raining or snowing”. This is not made true by correspondence with a complex alternative fact, either-rain-or-snow. It is true if either of the atomic parts of which it is composed (“it is raining” and “it is snowing”) is true. Thus compound or “molecular” statements do not correspond or fail to correspond to compound facts; they can be broken down into atomic statements which do, when true, correspond to atomic facts. The aim of analysis was to break down complex facts into their atomic components, the method to analyse complex statements into theirs. Russell’s conception of analysis was influenced in two main ways by the fact that he came to metaphysics from the study of mathematics and formal logic. As a mathematician, he regarded all defined terms as theoretically superfluous. Thus if “two” can be defined as “one plus one” and “three” as “two plus one” it is clear that arithmetical operations could be carried on with no numerals other than “one”. He had himself claimed

to “eliminate” in this way even the notion of “number” by defining it in terms belonging to logic. As a metaphysician, Russell held that if the word “number” could be eliminated by being defined, then numbers are not part of the ultimate constituents of the world which it was his aim to discover. These constituents, whatever they turned out to be, would be only such things as would be named in a language in which all defined terms had been replaced by ultimately indefinable terms.

Secondly, Russell’s study of logic had convinced him that the *grammar* of all natural languages is radically misleading. “Horses do not bellow” and “chimaeras do not exist” have the same grammatical form; but while the first denies that certain objects (horses) have a certain property (bellowing), the second does not deny that chimaeras have the property of existing. Rather it says that nothing in the world has the property of being a chimaera. Russell’s aim here was that of replacing expressions whose grammatical form was misleading by expressions of “proper logical form”, in which the grammatical structure would properly reflect the form of the fact stated. Confronted by the statement, “the average plumber earns ten pounds a week”, one might be puzzled by the question “Who is this average plumber?” and perhaps led into wild metaphysical speculation. The remedy was to see that the statement could be translated into “the number of pounds earned each week-by plumbers divided by the number of plumbers is ten”, a statement from which “the average plumber” has been eliminated. No one is likely to be bemused in such a simple case; but serious consequences, both theoretical and practical, had certainly followed from making the same mistake about more important objects such as “the State” or “Public Opinion”. It is clear that in some sense these, like armies, governments, schools and other institutions are abstractions and that to say something about them is to say something, though not the same thing, about the people who make them up. In technical language they were said to be “logical constructions” out of the more concrete objects (people) who compose them. Russell and his followers had high hopes that analysis could be carried to yet deeper metaphysical levels by showing that the things, including people, that we normally treat as being on the “ground-floor level” of experience, were logical constructions out of more fundamental entities.

(3) Russell’s views on logic and techniques of analysis were taken up by the **logical positivists**, but used with a very different aim. Where Russell sought a true metaphysical theory, the positivists held *all* metaphysics to be nonsensical and were mainly concerned to establish a sharp line between metaphysics and natural science. Analysis was to be used first for the elimination of metaphysics and secondly for the clarification of the language of science. The word “elimination” here is to be taken in a much more straightforward sense than in connection with Russell. Russell had not claimed that the objects which his analytical method “eliminated” did not, in the ordinary sense, exist; only that they were not metaphysically ultimate. Water exists; but because it is composed of oxygen and hydrogen it is not part of the “ultimate furniture of the Universe”;

and this is shown by the fact that the word “water” can be replaced by “H<sub>2</sub>O”. The positivists, on the other hand, used analysis to show that certain words used by metaphysicians and, in consequence, the theories in which those words appear were literally nonsensical.

Since all metaphysics, including Russell’s atomism, was to be eliminated, a new aim had to be found for analysis; for metaphysical truth was not merely impossible for us to attain, it was an absurd goal to aim at. It had never been agreed just *what* was to be analysed. Was it to be concepts and propositions, as Moore said? Or facts, as Russell usually said? In practice this had made less difference than might be expected, since the actual technique of analysis had always been the replacement of one *expression* (word, phrase or sentence) by another. The method was linguistic, though both Moore and Russell have always repudiated linguistic aims. With the positivists, aim and method come closer together; for both “concepts” and “facts” come under the ban of being metaphysical, thought is identified with language, and the analysis of linguistic expressions is an end in itself. The clarification and articulation of the language of science can hardly be regarded as an extrinsic aim.

The name “linguistic analysis” is often now used for a general approach to philosophy which has been wide-spread in the English-speaking world. These philosophers differ widely among themselves, for example in their degree of affection towards metaphysics. Their method is certainly linguistic, since it involves paying careful, even minute attention to the actual usage of words, phrases and sentences in a living language; but it cannot, in any clear or strict sense, be called “analysis”. What is common to all the linguistic analysts is the belief that the first step towards the solution of a philosophical problem is to examine the key words in the area that generates the problem and to ask how they are in fact used. Thus problems of perception are to be solved, not by condemning ordinary language wholesale and inventing a new vocabulary (impressions, sensations, sense-data), but by asking what precisely we are claiming when we claim to see something. This is the sort of question which Moore asked; but whereas Moore jumped, almost without argument, to the conclusion that the answer must be given in terms of “sense-data”, the linguistic analysts try to answer it by exploring the locutions in which the verb “to see” and kindred words actually occur. There is nothing here to which we can point as being “analysis” as we can point to definitional substitution in Moore and Russell. Perhaps the survival of the name “analysis” is only a just tribute which some philosophers pay to those who have greatly influenced them and from whose work their own work stems. See also **Analytic Philosophy**.

(P.H.N.-S.)

**Analytic.** The terms “analytic” and “synthetic” were introduced by **Kant**, who defined an analytic judgment as one in which the idea of the predicate is already contained in that of the subject and therefore adds nothing to it. Thus “all bodies are extended in space” is analytic, since the idea of extension is contained in that of body. On the other hand “all bodies have some weight” is synthetic since the



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